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This work addresses the question of Why has there not been an increase in support for 
far-right organizations in Mexico? The author uses process tracing with a wide data 
range in order to overcome the lack of academic research done in the country about the 
far right. First, the theoretical framework for the far, radical and populist radical right 
are established, with a focus on populism and the populist radical right in the United 
States and Europe. Furthermore, the author narrates the historical background of the 
far right in Mexico in order to establish the primary characteristics and continuity from 
the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution until today. The main work is focused on 
explaining the process for the far right between 2008-2019. The author concludes that 
the far right in Mexico hasn’t been able to establish a foothold in large parts of the 
population, hindering their ability to grow; this in part to the lack of rallying topics 
such as migration or common external enemies such as the EU and their close links to 
the country’s economic elite. It also concludes that the far right has appeared in limited 
numbers in Mexico derived from the introduction of progressive laws in Mexico City 
as well as the election of left-leaning president Andres Manuel López Obrador. In a 
nutshell, there seems to be no appetite for a comparable growth in the far right in 
Mexico, despite their renovated activity in the last few years, so the appearance of a 
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Almost every generation must face a challenge to its status quo. Posterior to the Second 
World War the Western World was in dire need to provide structure and a strong 
ideological background to the new world order. And so, financial, supra national and 
regional institutions were set up, all this in order to achieve a new era of world peace. 
However, some of the ghosts from the pre-war era have shown their face again, echoes 
of the fascism wave that brought the world to a catastrophic war have made their way 
into the political mainstream in the shape of populist radical right (PRR) parties and 
organizations. Even going as far as emulating symbols and discourses from a dark and 
shameful era, authoritarian, xenophobic and nativist leaders have rushed to fill the 
vacuum of power that the struggles of a globalizing world leave empty1.  
 
However, these new challenges to democratic order, and public discourse have not 
appeared in the same shapes and forms in different parts of the world. Current academic 
efforts, especially in the West, have disproportionally focused their attention on the 
phenomena developing in Europe and the United States, much like most relevant 
academic efforts2. Giving little attention to relevant developments in other parts of the 
world. In so, this thesis work will make an attempt at explaining the far right in Mexico 
and its more contemporary iteration the populist radical right: its historical origins, 
main characteristics, current social and political context, and finally, how it differs 
greatly from its counterparts in the United States and Europe. This effort will be carried 
out around a central question, that approaches the current situation of the populist 
radical right in the country, and why it has not appeared as strongly, decisively and 
successfully as in other parts of the world.  
 




1 Kim, n.d. 
2 Kerner, 2018, pp. 550-563 
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There is some historical evidence of the presence of far right parties and organizations 
in the political and social life of Mexico for at least 100 years3. A sort of by-product of 
the secular character of the Mexican Revolution and its aftermath. However, as will be 
addressed later in this work, the secretive and discrete nature of some this 
organizations, has made it difficult to properly identify them and understand their main 
motifs. Far right organizations have come and gone from public life, usually 
accompanied by rally-around-the-flag efforts with specific issues in mind such as 
communism, progressive social rights, religious freedom, and many others. While 
formal political parties have never gathered enough support in order to remain relevant 
active political players, instead shifting and dissolving consistently over the years.  
 
This research puzzle, presents a specific set of challenges: first, the lack of relevant 
information, either from media, academia, or other sources, as it remains a scarcely 
researched topic in Mexico; second, the profound theoretical and research focus in far 
parties and organizations in Europe and the United States, where we do have copious 
relevant information that provide a theoretical approach and insights but it fail to 
address the local context in formulating explanations, either for the Mexican or other 
regional cases outside the West. 
 
Given the particularities of the far right in Mexico and the challenges mentioned above, 
a specific methodology was needed in order to be able to carry out this work of 
research. The limitations of a positivist approach, meaning the search for theory 
building that allowed for generalizations proved to be too grand for this topic in 
particular. And so, a more eclectic and wholesome approach was needed. Process 
tracing appeared to be the most suitable methodology in order to explain this particular 
outcome, while being able to include the widest variety of data and sources, allowing 
the author to construct a sufficient enough narrative that would be able to explain the 
current context of the far right in Mexico as well as its characteristics and perhaps make 
some predictions about its future. The author goes beyond what is traditionally 
 
3 Uribe, 2008, pp. 49-44 
 9 
considered as good process tracing, that would involve theory building or theory 
explaining methodology, and focuses instead on outcome explaining methods using a 
deductive approach. This methodology seems the most appropriate to study a specific 
case such as the current research puzzle4.  
 
It is important to mention, that the author could not find any research works focus on 
the populist radical right, far right, or extreme right that used process tracing. As for 
the reasons that this hasn’t been attempted, it is difficult to venture an explanation. 
However, the author did made due diligence by comparing the methodological 
approaches of other works such as the article by Kyung Joon Han, in which he studied 
behavioral patterns in European Values Surveys in order to establish a correlation with 
voting intentions for radical right parties5; or the comparative study by David and Deole 
in which they established a correlation between foreign-born population percentages 
and support for far right parties by crossing it with macroeconomic indicators and 
individual wealth and education indicators6. As relevant as this connections and 
inferences are, such an approach for an initial effort in the Mexican scenario as this 
work is, might be more relevant in a further research that goes beyond what’s described 
here.  
  
Therefore, process tracing with a wholesome social science research approach allows 
the author to properly process the myriad of data and information needed. As 
mentioned above, the lack of specific information regarding this topic creates a 
necessity to include and analyze large numbers of information in order to create the 
necessary links for a sufficient explanation. In so, historical secondary sources help 
explain the roots and historical context of the far right in Mexico; party manifestos and 
public statements by their leaders help construct a general idea of their ideology and 
goals; electoral results and party identification surveys aid in connecting popular 
 
4 Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, pp. 222-237 
5 Han, K. J. (2016). Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties. Electoral Studies, 42, 
54–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.02.001 
6 Davis, L., & Deole, S. S. (n.d.). Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe. 3. 
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support for certain political parties; demographic and economic statistical data provides 
the reader with a clearer idea on the population groups that identify or not with the far 
right in the country; ethnographic information better explain the current social context 
for discrimination, migration and nativism; and finally, distinct academic works from 
Mexico and abroad, provide insightful information that allows this work to go deeper 
into the historical process that created the characteristics of the far right in Mexico and 
its profound differences with its counterparts around the world, especially in Europe 
and the United States.  
 
However, if the contemporary manifestation of the far right, the populist radical right, 
as such, has not appeared in Mexico, in comparison to the United States or Europe, 
why is it important to study it? The fact of the matter is the reasons behind its apparent 
irrelevance in the country are the more relevant to understand the greater process that 
encircles the far right in other parts of the world. Not only could it help understand 
PRR better in Europe and the US but could also provide insight in how to counter it as 
it looks for undermining democratic institutions elsewhere.  
 
This argument of course, added to the fact that political developments in Mexico have 
a greater impact in world politics and economics as it could be expected. Mexico 
remains one of the top world economies and is expected to be in the top 10 economies 
in the next few decades. It is also a major economic partner to the United States, the 
European Union, and much of Asia7. Finally, the country remains a political and 
cultural powerhouse in Latin-America, specially at a time where other major powers in 
the region have decided to look inwards and have stop engaging in the region.  
 
Finally, in order to better explain the complex process for the far right in Mexico this 
work will be structured as follows: first, the theoretical framework and literature review 
will give an overview of the current academical works and theories in regard to the 
topic at hand; second, the selection process for the case and methodology, followed by 
 
7 Mexico’s Top Trading Partners 2019, n.d. 
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a wide data overview of the different types of information, sources and data utilized in 
this research; third a wide historical review divided into the Genesis of the far right in 
Mexico with a focus on its origins and success, and the current state and context of the 
PRR in the country; finally we continue with the analysis and comparison of the far 
right in Mexico, by establishing its main characteristics, and contrasting them with 





































Fundamental theory of the Far Right and its historical and 
contemporary context in Mexico 
 
Theoretical framework and Literature Review 
 
First, we must provide a working definition of radical right, as this will be the family 
group from which the work ahead will be developing. Cas Mudde states that the radical 
right are ideologies that believe that inequalities between people are natural and 
positive and that accept the essence of democracy but oppose fundamental elements of 
liberal democracy8. For the complete understanding of the political family that includes 
the radical right and populist radical right, it is also relevant to include a working 
definition for the extreme right, going ahead with Mudde, he defines it as a close sibling 
to radical right, in which inequalities between people are positive, even desirable, 
however the main difference being that the extreme right rejects the essence of 
democracy, in contrast to radical right that accepts most elements of it9. The 
combination of the radical right and extreme right would encompass the full far right 
as an umbrella term.  
 
Before proceeding and providing a working definition of the populist radical right, it is 
necessary to define populism. This work conceptualizes populism with a 
complimentary approach using a number of definitions: first, the definition by Robert 
Jansen in which populism is a mode of political practice, aimed at mobilizing 
“ordinarily marginalized sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action” 
(Jansen 2011, p. 82. Populism represents a “sustained political project” that combines 
“popular mobilization with populist rhetoric” (Jansen 2011, p. 82. Only where both 
are present and mutually reinforce each other can we speak of a genuine populist 
mobilization10; second, the definition by Cas Mudde, in which populism is a (thin) 
 
8 Mudde, 2019, p. 328 
9 Mudde, 2019, p. 325 
10 Rydgren, 2018, p. 140 
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ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volunté génerale (general will) of the people11; 
Finally, since the focus of this study is Mexico, it is important to also include at least 
one definition of populism derived from the Latin-American context, Kurt Weyland 
conceptualizes populism from the study of Latin-American politics, in which it is 
defined as a political strategy, with the aim to obtain or remain in power, that also rests 
in the capability of numbers. Populism is intimately linked to personalistic leaders who 
base their power in uninstitutionalized support emanated from large numbers of people. 
This definition encompasses classical populists from the 1930s and onwards12. While 
this last definition is useful to understand some of the regional context, it leaves out the 
economic factors of populism, that might be triggers in the more contemporary 
definitions of Mudde and Jansen. While these first two definitions cover the 
contemporary dynamics, if we take into account the delay in certain processes in 
Mexico, it may very well be that older definitions would complement the understanding 
of the concept in relation to this particular country. In so, this work will utilize the 
elements of Cas Mudde’s definition regarding the separation of society into 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, such as the people and the elite, but also 
considering the relevance of popular mobilization, from Jansen and Weyland.  
 
The populist radical right is one of the political concepts defining the current era, it is 
a notion fundamental to understand it. From Europe to the Americas, we can find a 
deep transformation in the complex political landscapes of a variety of nations. Most 
of these transformations can be framed as an action of or a reaction to the populist 
radical right. Cas Mudde (2016) provides a working definition of this phenomenon in 
his work Populist Radical Right: A Reader and many works. He does so by naming the 
main characteristics of populist radical right parties and movements as follows as a way 
of definition: (1) nativism as a xenophobic form of nationalism; (2) authoritarianism, 
a strictly ordered society in which any sort of infringement of such an order should be 
 
11 Mudde, 2019, p. 327 
12 Weyland, 2001, p. 18 
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severely punished; (3) populism, a constitution of society into two antagonistic groups: 
on the one hand, the corrupt elite “in control”, on the other hand, the pure people 
struggling against the dominant group13, he goes on further to portray it as a thin-
centered ideology that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the 
people14 as mentioned above. While Mudde’s work offers a broad definition for the 
populist radical right, his approach remains very much localized in the West, taking his 
major examples both from the United States and Europe, despite his recent efforts to 
move beyond the western sphere in his most recent work. For matters of clarity, 
populist radical right and radical right will tend to be used similarly in this work albeit 
taking into account the theoretical nuances between one and the other, as the definition 
from the Oxford handbook of the Radical right provides a similar enough definition as 
Mudde: Rydgren explains how “Radical right parties and movements share an 
emphasis on ethnonationalism[…]They also tend to be populists[…]In their political 
platforms, this ideological core is often embedded in a general sociocultural 
authoritarianism that stresses themes such as law and order and family values”15 
 
In order to more thoroughly outline how these characteristics, present themselves in 
the Realpolitik, it is necessary to firstly regard the cases most relevant according to the 
academic literature. It is clear that one of the main scenarios where the far right has 
become alarmingly evident is in the United States, with the outbreak of the Tea Party 
movement and the later take-over of the Republican establishment, mainly during 
Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016 as somehow predicted by Williamson, Skocpol 
and Coggin16. Nativism being one of its main drivers, in this sense, it is worth noting 
that nativism in the United States is not a new phenomenon, for we can trace it back to 
at least the 19th century, much further back than in Europe. Anti-immigration 
movements have been an integral part of the US political system, one of the main 
examples being the Native American Party, which in 1854 managed to get as much as 
 
13 Mudde 2016, pp. 25-27 
14 Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, pp. 541–563.  
15 Ibid., pp. 23-24 
16 Williamson et al., 2011 
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52 members in the House of Representatives. This continued through the century with 
the strengthening of the Ku Klux Klan, and eventually with groups sympathetic to 
Fascism and Nazi Germany. Overall, the far right became closely linked to anti-
immigration politics and anti-government positions, with both areas operating in 
different political spheres, either at an elite or a grassroots level. The contemporary 
example of these groups is manifested in the Tea Party, which ended up heavily 
influencing the Republican apparatus, and which eventually led to the election of 
Donald Trump as Presidential candidate in 2016. In this regard, Mudde, in The Far 
Right in America, discussing the terrorist attacks in Oklahoma in 1995 and the Sikh 
massacre of Oak Creek in 2012, alerts against the threat that these far right groups 
represent both to the Government and to minority groups17.  
 
Another example of a study which explains the traits of the US radical right groups is 
Eric Miller’s study “God Hates” about the religious right in North America. In this 
study, Barret-Fox explains how Christian organizations have taken over a big part of 
the populist radical right discourse in the United States and are now actively promoting 
and financing political groups in order to further their agenda18. She also uses the 
example of the Evangelical lobby and how they use powerful tools to influence 
politicians and capture political discourse in the push for their agenda. On the same 
lines, Jeff Sharlet in the book The Family describes how Christian fundamentalist 
organizations are able to co-opt politicians in the US. He refers to the case of the 
National Prayer Breakfast, which has become a lobbying ground between politicians 
and religious leaders strong enough for US Presidents to be in attendance every year19. 
Another important study dealing with groups financing operations from the United 
States into other parts of the world is Jane Mayer and Walter Mondane’s book Dark 
Money on covert and open financing of radical right organizations, think-tanks, 
candidates and media, and how these efforts are profoundly linked to big money 
donors. Just to name an example, she mentions the case of anti-abortion campaigns 
 
17 Mudde, 2017, pp. 11-13 
18 Miller, 201, pp. 339-341 
19 Sharlet, 2008, pp. 1-9 
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popping up in Europe financed by Christian fundamentalist groups in the United 
States20.  
 
All of these studies come to the conclusion that Christian fundamentalist organizations, 
portraying much of the characteristics of radical right groups, have found a way into 
politics in the United States and are constantly pushing for a conservative agenda and 
even for violence. While these studies are able to explain the success and penetration 
of groups in the United States, and their relation to new movements in Europe, they 
fail to address the success or lack of success of such movement in other parts of the 
world. For this, the present work attempts to identify some general variables and then 
compare them to relevant cases in Mexico, in order to extrapolate similarities and 
differences that might help explain the current scenario concerning far right and radical 
right groups in Mexico.  
 
The literature on European far right parties shows that this groups have their own set 
of specific circumstances in contrast to their US counterparts or other regions of the 
world. As discussed in Mudde’s paper “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe 
Redux”, there are some general characteristics regarding European radical right groups: 
first, there is not an unified populist radical right, instead there are many different types 
of organizations and parties that resemble or could be considered as PRRs (Populist 
Radical Right groups, for short); second, the element of the European Union and their 
degree of opposition to it might tip the balance to include a party in the far right family, 
since being anti or pro EU might also intertwine with EU values that could directly 
contradict the traditional characteristics of the populist radical right; third, they include 
anti-immigrant and nativist ideologies and feelings, often linked to anti-Islam 
positions21. Mudde also goes as far as to make a comparison between East and West, 
parting from the example of how in the East, the populist radical right also embodies 
the difficult transition from the Soviet bloc into European democracies, thus giving 
space for anti or pro-Russian postures in the blocks. He also explains how there is no 
 
20 Mayer & Mondale, 2016, pp. 11-67 
21 Mudde 2009, pp. 330-337 
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international network of far-right parties or organizations. Most of the time these 
parties’ differences keep them separate. However, we can see the beginnings of such 
organizations working together (although not successfully) in an effort by Mateo 
Salvini, from the Northern League, to create a solid voting bloc in the European 
Parliament. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the conceptualization emanating from 
Europe works best to describe such parties. However, much can still be gained from 
widening the research scope to include elements from outside the western sphere. This 
is in part what the present work is attempting to do by complementing existing literature 
with a new case focused on Mexico. 
 
Meanwhile, Provost and Fitzgerald are successful in establishing the links between 
dark money sources and religious right established branches in Europe. They go on to 
explain their focus on refuting liberal values and norms in Europe such as LGBT rights, 
reproductive rights, the promotion of a strict family model, and finally, with the 
possible illegal financing of populist radical right politicians and parties across the 
continent22.  
 
However, Mos in his article “The fight of the Religious Right in Europe: old whines in 
new bottles” goes further and makes a good case about how these organizations are not 
able to operate identically as in the US, they need to adapt their strategies to fit the 
current European Union’s structures23. Further, he explains how instead of challenging 
directly the institutions of the European Union, they have changed their discourse with 
the use of common language in human rights and science while using the ambiguity of 
the treaties in their favour and promoting conservative values using technicalities. 
Hence, this article actually makes some echo as to how religious right groups operate 
in Mexico and as such it can be useful in making a comparison to business groups 
support for propaganda campaigns, and far-right policies as stated by Tirado in his 
research regarding who finances the far right in the country24. It is interesting to note 
 
22 Provost & Fitzgerald, 2019 
23 Mos, 2018 
24 Tirado, 1985, pp. 105-121 
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that the financing does not only go one way: Mexican far-right groups such as el 
Yunque have established branches in Spain and France and are actively promoting far-
right agendas with policy makers, such as the organization Hazte Oír25.  
 
Until now, the far right in Mexico has not been explained in full. In fact, there is very 
scarce contemporary literature on the far right in Mexico. With the exception of Monica 
Uribe’s “La ultraderecha en México: el conservadurismo moderno” which gives us a 
detailed overview of the historical reach of the far right in the country, from its 
beginnings in the Mexican Revolution, the World War II stage and the development of 
the modern Mexican state26. She details how the far right has been heavily linked to 
big money and how their influence in politics has been longstanding27. She also makes 
a deep description on the vast network of organizations and their links between them 
and political parties, student movements, religious organizations, and the Catholic 
church28. This work is the most detailed historical explanation on the process the far 
right has followed in Mexico since the 1930s, but it fails to explain the proper causes 




As a result of this lack of research, the far right in Mexico remains mostly invisible or 
easily dismissible, making it difficult to understand their goals and reach. This study 
addresses this shortcoming by conceptualizing the far right in Mexico within the 
framework of contemporary radical right studies with the goal of making susceptible 
to the analytical tools of the existing literature on the subject.  
 
The aim of this study is to explain the characteristics of the Mexican equivalent of the 
radical right and its recent iteration the populist radical right and contribute to the 
 
25 Cf. “‘El Yunque’, la sociedad paramilitar vinculada con HazteOír, cada vez menos secreta,” n.d. 
26 Uribe, 2008, pp. 39-57 
27 Ibid.,  
28 Ibid.,  
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general knowledge of the field by examining the Mexican case and explaining the 
outcome within the framework of process tracing with an interpretative approach. 
Taking advantage of process tracing, as conceptualized by Beach and Pedersen 
regarding its ability to explain case-specific outcomes29. 
 
For this we will work with a general research puzzle from which several expectations 
will be framed and worked on. 
 
Why has there not been an increase in support for far parties and organizations in 
Mexico? 
 
This question is framed in the 2008-2019 timeline for Mexico that happens to 
intertwine with the fourth wave of the far right as mentioned by Mudde30. Within this 
research puzzle we have a number of expectations derived from the preliminary work 
done by the author from which the narrative and analytical structure of this academic 
effort derives. These expectations will be approached using a plural approach to 
methodology and data analysis; for it is relevant for this particular case to include a 
wide variety of data and methodological sources, both for the lack of information about 
it, and for the shifting and elusive nature of the topic at hand. Furthermore, it is 
important to mention that the expectations enshrined in this work are based on general 
observations made by the author into the contemporary politics of the far right in 
Mexico while carrying out the elaboration of the timeline presented along this work.  
 
The main expectations to be found are as follows: 
 
1. The far right in Mexico got primarily activated due to the introduction of 
highly controversial laws in Mexico City and the National Government, mainly the 
right for abortion and equal marriage. 
 
29 Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp.9-22 




2. The far right in Mexico, in contrast to its European and US counterparts has 
not established a link with the traditional population targets, being economically 
disaffected, or uneducated youth. Instead, the far right biggest appeal is to educated 
and affluent middle and high classes. 
 
3. The new left government in Mexico has sparked a further surge as the 
Mexican equivalent of white anxiety takes over former power structures. 
 
4. Immigration is not an issue in Mexico, multiculturalism and acceptance have 

























Methodology and overview of data 
 
The Mexican Case 
 
Mexico is the 6th largest democracy in the world, with over 124 million inhabitants. 
Heir to both indigenous and European culture and tradition. It is also the 15th biggest 
economy in the world and a fundamental part of the largest economic block: The North 
American Free Trade Area. Just the size of its population and economic power are 
reason enough for the political characteristics of the country to be of academic interest. 
However, there is also enough specific national traits that would spark interest in how 
one of the most studied phenomena of our time in social sciences, far right, has 
developed in such a country. Mexico has a mixed legislative system with both direct 
and proportional representation, it has also undergone a slow and progressive 
democratic transition since 1997, and while it portrays some of the perfect social 
disparity characteristics perfect for the far right and its subdivisions to fester, it doesn’t 
seem to be the case.   
 
For this work, the author will look into contemporary far right groups in Mexico, with 
a focus on larger organizations like the National Family Front, the National Citizen’s 
Congress, or ultra-catholic groups like El Yunque or The Parents National Association; 
also focusing on non-governmental organizations, and their links to political parties 
and business groups such as No Más Derroches, Mexican Green Vests and the National 
Mexican Front. If we follow the historical development of far right groups in Mexico 
since the dawn of the Mexican revolution, we can find a direct progression between 
groups such as El Yunque or The Parents National Association and groups emanated 
from the Cristero War of the post-revolutionary years; and so, these groups have been 
selected for the most part as they share a common historical origin. Additionally, some 
of the most contemporary organizations, such as the National Mexican Front or 
Mexican Green Vests, seem to answer to some of the same social triggers as PRR 
organizations and parties in other parts of the world, such as nativism, anti-elitism or 
 22 
authoritarianism, making a comparison feasible. As of today, most of the organizations 
mentioned in this work are still active, and it was possible to document their existence, 
part of their ideology and if they are still active or not.  
 
In the case of Mexican far right organizations, a deep enough link is not seen between 
them and the populist radical right movements in Europe and the United States, at least 
not yet. Even if there are growing signs of anti-immigrant rhetoric, the main groups 
and supporters seem to be still a part of the middle and upper echelons of Mexican 
society, making the populist and anti-elite discourse difficult to attain. In any case anti-
elite sentiment would seem to be directed not from the populist radical right towards 
elites, but from the populist radical left towards their opposing sides. Even the 
possibility of populism/nativism from above seem to be discarded as the elites seem to 
be deeply divided between those currently in power and the groups that historically 
have controlled public office.  
 
However, there is a clear view of authoritarian and some xenophobic attitudes. There 
is also a set of traits that would place them in a similar category to the Christian right, 
like the support for anti-abortion measures or the promotion of a conservative family 
model and the despise for LGBT rights31. The latter could be tied to “white anxiety”, 
such as the one documented by Jennifer Richeson in her recent study in how the white 
population might react in a hostile manner to a racial shift in the United States, and 
how this can affect intergroup interactions32. An example would be the strong reaction 
that rose during the very symbolic victory of Barack Obama, in which a good part of 
the white, Christian population felt disenfranchised33, much like the Mexican middle 
and upper classes might feel with the rise of a left government lead by someone not 
from the elite. It is difficult to categorize the appearance of these traits as a surge, 
mostly because they do not seem to be widespread enough, especially when it looks 
like they are constrained by the nature of the Mexican political system that traditionally 
 
31 Cf. Tirado, 1985 
32 Craig & Richeson, 2014 
33 Cf. Douthat, n.d. 
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relied on center-politics and a preference for keeping political forms34. They are also 
constrained, so it seems, by a strong contradiction from groups that are anti-systemic 
but at the same time enshrine the system because of the order it provides, perhaps 
hinting that the only thing they are actually against is the current government and not 
really the system. 
 
Process Tracing and multi-method research 
 
The question of the absence of the far right in Mexico seems immediately 
counterintuitive in a country with high levels of income inequality and migration, 
specially taking into account that these two characteristics are well documented as 
having a strong correlation to the rise of PRR in other parts of the world35. It is this 
apparent strange absence that leads the scholar to process tracing as the ideal method 
to explain such a peculiar outcome as this methodology will allow to construct and 
validate loosely connected variables in a set period of time utilizing all the tools 
available to the discipline in a plural and varied manner36. Process tracing helps us 
establish multiple links in a causal chain that can be diagramed and formalized in order 
to explain as much in a sufficient manner a specific outcome, that would not be able to 
be explained with more common research methodologies37. In this method I use 
multiple types of evidence in order to verify a number of expectations, such types of 
evidence can include qualitative, such as interviews, historic recollections, media 
content, opinion pieces, amongst others; and quantitative data such as election result 
information, demographic data, economic indicators, opinion polls, and such,  as well 
as general inferences about the case being studied, that will help construct the widest 
explanation possible for the studied outcome.  
 
 
34 Loaeza, n.d. 
35 Passari, 2020 
36 Cf. Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, n.d. 
37 Gerring, 2006 
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In this work the author will carry out a sort of detective work in order to explain a 
particular outcome linked, in this particular account, to the Mexican scenario for far 
right parties and organizations, their characteristics, existence and success. Beach and 
Pedersen conceptualize this type of process tracing method as “Explaining outcome 
process-tracing”. They go on to explain how in practice this the most common used 
method is, instead of “theory-building” or “theory explaining” in which causal 
hypotheses have a much stronger role in explaining relationships38.  
 
To summarize, “explaining outcome process-tracing” consists of the next four 
elements: first, it is case-centric; second, it aims to build theorized causal mechanisms; 
three, it looks to identify case-specific mechanisms instead of building generalizations; 
and finally, fourth, it enables inferences about the sufficiency of the explanation to be 
made39. Additionally, given the specificity of the Mexican case and the necessary local 
knowledge, the author sticks to John Gerring when he says that in some circumstances 
non-comparable observation might be more scientific than sample-based inferences 
(Gerring 2006:172-187).  
 
The author also consulted other research works that use process tracing, such as The 
Regional Dimension of Statebuilding Interventions by Benjamin Brast. In his work, 
Brast uses process tracing as an ideal tool to build a causal mechanism for a single case 
study, in this particular work Brast is looking at how the state building efforts in Sierra 
Leone were successful despite having very adverse conditions, much like in this work, 
Brast is trying to explain an outlier case. Brast also establishes a number of theoretical 
expectations that will help establish the process and its characteristics in the 
conclusions. He also explains why process tracing is ideal for single cases or small 
research designs because it allows to bypass the indeterminacy of larger studies and 
can look into the inside of causation instead of whether a cause and an outcome are 
present. Brast proceeds to explain the historical context in which Sierra Leone state 
 
38 Beach & Pedersen, 2013pp. 10-12 
39 Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 13-14 
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building efforts took place and then into the process itself, reaching conclusions that 
matched and also surprised his expectations40.  
 
The main channel for this work will be a timeline from 2008 to late 2019 (Annex 1) in 
which the most relevant happenings and benchmarks from different far right 
organizations in Mexico will be included, as well as general information about 
elections, legislative efforts of controversial topics such as abortion and equal marriage, 
public protest, and migration. This timeline allowed to author to construct a narrative 
and systematize patterns in the processes that took place in Mexico in the time the 
author observed a notable activity of far right groups in the country. While the timeline 
remains an additional part of the work it provided the foundation for most of the 
expectations and structure for this work. 
 
In the view of the author 2008 marks a new start of public activity for far right groups 
in Mexico, sparked by the equal marriage proposal in Mexico City, and in so works as 
a good starting point for making informed observations in their scope, size and goals; 
in such, 2019 is a also a good finishing point as the COVID-19 crisis hasn’t begun and 
the political situation in the country fostered some interesting findings and observed 
activity without the additional shake up of the new pandemic crisis distorting further 
the data. It is also important to mention, that while the focus of this work is pointed 
towards this specific period of time as it aligns itself with the latest developments 
explained by some of the studies and papers consulted for this work; it will be critical 
for the validation of expectations ,derived from the previous work, to span a much 
wider time frame in order to include numerous historical records that help better 
explain the research question. 
 
This method does not come without challenges; according to Venneson we need to 
look out for 4 main challenges while using process tracing: first, the reliance on pre-
 
40 Brast, 2015, pp. 82-90 
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existing theories, for this the author must refer to the theoretical framework and 
literature review present in this work, in order to prove that he has analyzed the 
necessary frameworks for such a work; second, the assumption that each case can be 
treated autonomously and that the cases are distinct from one another, for this  have 
revised other cases, where there is available information, in order to verify that the 
conditions in Mexico haven not been found as such in another published case; third, 
the need for empirical data: there is widely available data regarding the socio economic 
situation in Mexico, as well as opinion data for a number of issues that  will address in 
this work such as immigration, political compass polls, elections, programmatic 
agendas from parties, party sympathy, etc., as well as a number, albeit small, of 
previously published works on the far right in Mexico and its history. However, 
recognize that there are not many contemporary works on the subject and less so in line 
with the phenomenon we can observe in Europe or the United States, this I will tackle 
by using data from works in ethnography and political compass that can give us an 
insight into the most contemporary characteristics of populist radical right 
organizations in Mexico and their ideology; finally, fourth, cognitive biases, this being 
the biggest challenge as the author comes from a politicized environment in Mexico 
and might already have bound biases, however well sourced quantitative data and a 
strong theoretical framework should suffice to avoid this last challenge, however the 




Data gathering and analysis for a work such as the present one produces a number of 
very specific challenges: first, the lack of organized and readily available information 
that presents a coherent storyline on the subject does not, for the most part, exist yet; 
the nature of the methodological approach, even if correct, requires the casting of the 
widest net possible in order to obtain as much information as possible for the author to 
generate enough links in the storyline to produce recognizable results; and third, the 
 
41 Della, 2008, pp. 236-239 
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mass media panorama in Mexico is unique in its historical dependance on public 
funding that might have distorted coverage on controversial or critical issues.  
 
In order to address these issues, this work has been organized both chronologically and 
by addressing one by one each of the expectations that complement the research 
question, which will be finally focused on in the analysis and conclusions section. 
Furthermore, each expectation is accompanied by a myriad of data sources that attempt 
to create an academic and historical picture of the process that the populist radical right 
has followed in the country, it’s main characteristics, contemporary social context, and 
maybe even possible scenarios for the immediate future.  
 
As explained before this paper has been structured in a way that allows the reader to 
follow on the historical process of the far right in Mexico, both inside the contemporary 
timeframe of 2008-2019 and in a wider scale from the beginning of the XX century. 
This historical approach proves necessary as it builds enough social, cultural and 
historical context to frame the contemporary scenario in Mexico for the far right and 
its contemporary inception the populist radical right to exist, as well as it’s specific 
characteristics, product of this process. 
 
To construct this first historical narrative it was unavoidable to tap into historical 
sources, mainly secondary material from journalistic and academic origin. First, we 
begin by setting up the contemporary context of the populist radical right early in 2008 
as well as narrating political context, elections and other relevant information; the 
information and data  was gathered mostly from newspaper and digital media sources. 
News sources provide us with specific insight that scholarly sources may not, or that it 
could take them a long time to process. Here we can find contemporary opinions, as 
well as to evaluate the mood of society as well as of organized groups that made it into 
the headlines of the day42.  
 
 
42 Learning & Libraries, 2015 
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A further differentiation needs to be made evident between mass media and more 
specialized investigative journalism. Two main reasons for this specific choice: first, 
Mexico’s media ecosystem has been historically coopted by government agencies as 
official marketing efforts coopt media organizations with mass payouts without which 
most media wouldn’t be able to survive, generating a vicious cycle of structural 
censorship, heavily distorting what’s been covered and how43; and second, Mexico 
stands as one of the most dangerous places for journalists worldwide, with more than 
7 killings in 2020 so far, as corroborated by the World Free Press ranking from 
Journalists without borders44; further distorting coverage of critical or controversial 
issues around the country. Groups, such as the ones depicted further ahead, linked to 
the far right could have wished to remain secretive and take advantage of such a media 
scenario to censor coverage about them.  
 
It has been noted before in this research that there exists a persistent lack of information 
about the far right in Mexico, specially from academic sources. However, with notable 
exceptions such as weekly political investigative magazine Proceso, massive media in 
Mexico has overall failed to cover far right organizations in a way accessible to most 
of the public. As will become evident further down this work as we analyze the 
underground nature of said groups.  
 
Using process tracing in such an environment turns into a further challenge; however, 
being methodical and structured in the research allows the author to gather all auxiliary 
information, not usually found in large data sets. Instead rely on disparate, qualitative 
fragments of evidence about context, process, or mechanism45. In so, following the best 
practices of Bennett and Checkel, the widest net must be cast to acquire useful 
information. If we apply this principle to media in Mexico, it was evident that a mixture 
of different media sources would be necessary to avoid misinterpreting data and the 
social, political and cultural context of the studied timeframe from 2008 to 2019. 
 
43 Article 19 & Fundar, n.d. 
44 Mexico, n.d. 
45 Bennett & Checkel, 2015, pp. 211-212 
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Distinct types of journalism were included, such as news reports, coverage of live 
events, posterior analysis pieces, opinion pieces, poll reports, interviews, coverage of 
official sources, investigative pieces, breaking news reports, statistical analysis, 
amongst other.  
 
As such, an increasing number of Mexican media organizations have been included 
while trying to build the sought-after narrative: Animal Politico, Nacion321, El 
Economista, El Sol de Mexico, Nexos, El Universal, ADNPolitico, Sopitas, HuffPost 
Mexico, Contralínea, Expansión, El Cotidiano and Proceso. These are some of the most 
relevant printed media outlets in the country, with a digital presence from which the 
information was gathered from. They range in the size of their public from small to 
massive, as well as in their regional scope, association to the government, 
independence, and prestige. Media sources selected, where not limited only to topics 
involving the radical right, but they were used widely in order to build a complete 
narrative of the political context around the topic at hand in its respective time, this was 
complemented with historical and scholarly sources that study the early conception of 
the radical right in early XX century and ahead. The lack for academic data other than 
historical accounts, required the author to include as many sources as possible in order 
to generate a general overview of the information required, this in itself presented 
additional challenges, such as selecting data sources and sets that would fulfill minimal 
academic rigor standards. The author adhered to qualitative and quantitative scholarly 
standards while exercising personal criterion while including these sources.  
 
Not only where these sources included, but a number of additional sources were utilized 
to contrast and corroborate some of the stories and information. As well as a thorough 
effort was made to only include sources that seemed to have a rigorous journalistic 
process in order to avoid propaganda and misleading information as much as possible, 
following guidelines found in academic sources46.  
 
 
46  Engle, n.d. 
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Withing this effort, two exceptions are noteworthy: first, media such as Cultura 
Colectiva, that have a clear left bias were included for the specialization in covering 
controversial issues such as LGBT rights and Abortion rights that in a way haven’t 
found adequate coverage in other types of media, as stated in the report Digital Media 
in Mexico carried out by Open Society Foundation Mexico in 201147, such as their 
coverage on the anniversary of the 10 years of equal marriage laws in Mexico City; 
and second some openly stated opinion pieces that contributed to the building of the 
narrative but stated as such when presented. This media is included with the appropriate 
caution as to not misinterpret the achieved results.  
 
Finally, regarding media, a number of international sources were also included such as 
the New York Review, El País, Vox, BBC News, The Guardian and the Huffington 
Post in order to further solidify the historical narrative with international coverage of 
relevant events. This media was vetted utilizing the best practices from academic 
sources to select news media: such as history, prestige, journalistic process, perceived 
bias, amongst others48.  
 
Media sources however are not enough when constructing the historical narrative in 
how the far right emerged in Mexico and where its main characteristics come from. 
With this in mind a number of historical academic sources have been included: 
published books, academic papers and peer reviewed journal articles. This in order to 
utilize secondary historical sources so the author can overview and familiarize itself 
with the topic49. Secondary sources seem to be enough to aid in the generalization of 
insights to be utilized in the further analysis of the topic in this work. 
 
As has been mentioned before, the lack of scholarly work on the far right and its 
subdivisions rises a challenge when selecting the kind of scholarly work to include in 
 
47  Gómez & Sosa-Plata, 2011 
48 Engle, Ibid.,  
49 A Step by Step Guide to Doing Historical Research, n.d. 
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this work: there seems to be an increase in scholarly research into the history of the far 
right in Mexico that began in 2008 in the experience of this author, added to a few 
scattered works from the early 80s and 90s. With this in mind most of the scholarly 
work found has been included in one way or another. Disregarding the prestige or 
political bias of the authors; repeating the strategy with mass media, including as many 
sources as possible might give a general overview on the topic at hand without 
substantial distortion. It is important to mention that the majority of these academic 
works included approach to the topic of the far right from an historical perspective, 
without going deep into the analysis and interpretation of the data, mostly just 
generating historical narratives that tell the story of where it comes from and where it 
might be today. However, those sources that do provide analysis and insight will be 
also included to build on the general structure of this paper.  
 
Finally, to close the gap between mass media and academic historical sources a small 
number of mass media periodicals, that come with additional rigor were included. For 
example, the weekly magazine from newspaper El País from Spain, that keeps 
historical records of important events around the world or Nexos, Mexican academic 
magazine with both mainstream and academic collaborators. With these three main 
groups of sources: mass media, secondary academic sources and specialized 
publications, it is possible to gather enough historical information that will allow the 
narrative to be constructed and enriched with further hard data. 
 
It is important to note that one more historical source was included in this work: an 
interview with Dra. Moreno Toscano; Mexican historian, researcher from El Colegio 
de Mexico, former head of research in the National Institute for Anthropology and 
History, amongst other things. Because of the nature of this interview, it was impossible 
to record and transcribe. However, the author included sayings and opinions from Dra. 
Moreno given her closeness and authority on the subject to the best of his ability. 
 
Additional to the historical perspective on the far right, this work presents a series of 
expectations that will derive from the data analysis; in order to prove or disprove them 
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a number of academic sources on various topics, as well as statistical data on different 
issues, opinions and electoral results have been included. We begin by trying to provide 
dimension to the support far right parties and organizations have in Mexico today, as 
well as past support in the previous decades. Electoral results provide a clear-cut source 
of hard data, including party support in polls, electoral results for congress, president, 
local assemblies, municipalities, and other. The main source for this information is the 
National Electoral Institute, organization tasked with the handling and execution of 
elections in Mexico; additionally a number of secondary academic digital platforms 
have been utilized in order to better process and visualize the results in order to further 
analyze and interpret them, these platforms are mainly hosted by researchers of the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico, the most prestigious academic institution 
in the country, as well as publicly funded research centers in regional universities.  
 
Furthermore, in order to establish a connection between the electoral results and the 
voter’s different voter profiles have been included, specifically those regarding 
elections in 2015 and 2018, for these were the most complete profiles that could be 
found from trusted sources such as professional polling companies and universities. 
Some information prior to these elections were also found and included in specific 
cases such as the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) voter profile from the 90s as well as 
data analyzed between 1997-2003 in an academic work 
 
This connection between voter, party and electoral results was also complemented by 
the different party manifestos, and public statements from party leaders. The 
manifestos, when possible, were taken from the own party websites, and public 
statements from press coverage and the social media accounts of the covered 
individuals.  
 
Racial components of the argument made in this work were approached by two 
different ways: first establishing a baseline with the inclusion of several academic 
works by American authors, these works mostly focused on the effects of the Obama 
presidency, before and after his election and how these reactions had a strong racial 
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and economic component; and second, by including specific academic research about 
racial attitudes in Mexico between White and non-White populations around the 
country. While the argument can’t be directly compared, due to a lack of specific 
academic works, especially on the Mexican academic panorama, it is possible to 
extrapolate certain attitudes such as democratic values of different sections of Mexican 
society, into the argument of “White anxiety” carried by certain authors described 
further ahead in this work.  
 
The connection between “White anxiety” in Mexico and US is made through a series 
of economic and social indicators, as well as attitudes towards certain economic 
policies, carried out by academic surveys, as well as obtained from official statistical 
sources such as the Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI) in 
Mexico. Also, it is important to mention that a very specific set of indicators were 
chosen from secondary media sources and academic research in other topics to 
illustrate the contemporary social context in Mexico, such as: population that has 
traveled by plane, people that identify with a “liberal” ideology, income distribution 
index, attitude towards the government, amongst other.  
 
This argument is carried further ahead as the attitudes towards migration in Mexico are 
explored and compared to statistical data in Mexico and Europe; data that describes the 
ethnic composition of different countries in Europe as well as their comparison to 
Mexico. The statistical information is obtained from trusted statistical sources such as 
specialized media that use secondary sources that aim to explain the situation of 
migration in Europe. Theis last section is complimented with polling data focused on 
attitudes of different population groups towards migration in Mexico, and statistical 
information from academic sources in the same topic focused on European countries 
as well as media reports from Mexican local media sources that narrate migration-
related protests in specific cities with migration issues. 
 
Another important source of information, particularly when talking about controversial 
issues such as abortion or LGBT rights is reports from advocacy groups. Such as the 
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Group for Information in Elective Reproduction (GIRE), a prestigious advocacy group 
for women’s rights in Mexico, Open Society Foundations and Journalists without 
borders. These reports have proven an invaluable source of updated and relevant 
context source for the completion of this work.  These organizations appear to have 
positive national and international reputation, but the bias in their advocacy is taken 
into consideration for the inclusion of their materials in this academic pursuit.  
 
Regarding the section that describes public policies focused on multiculturalism, 
historical analysis of different secondary sources that focus on public policies 
implemented since the Mexican revolution was used. More specifically how these 
policies have affected social attitudes towards a multi-cultural society and its impact in 
attitudes towards migration and migrants.  
 
It is also important to explain the process in which the far right groups studied in 
Mexico where selected. It is important to note that almost all groups have a common 
origin in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution and the Cristero War, this historical 
link was important to identify far right groups and organizations, in so, most of the 
groups listed in this work have substantial connections to the historic far right in 
Mexico, embodied for the most part in Sinarquism, described below. Also, when 
observing the contemporary PRR and radical right groups in Mexico between 2008-
2019, the author realized that these groups took part in efforts to counter same-sex 
marriage, abortion rights, amongst other progressive measures. While this groups differ 
in size, scope and topics, most of them at least fulfilled these two characteristics, 
narrowing the scope of the study carried out.  
 
Finally, to accompany the analytical chapter in the contemporary far right in Mexico it 
is important to note that organizational manifestos, press releases, information on their 
websites and public statements by their leaders have been utilized in order to construct 
a profile and establish the ideology and characteristics of these organizations. As they 
are of recent formation there’s little no none academic work that would help in this 
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research; however, their links to historical radical right organizations in Mexico can 
also be auxiliary in their definition by this present work. 
 
Genesis of the Far Right in Mexico 
Battleground Mexico City: progressive ideas and the Christian Right 
 
The first half of 2007 was a turning point for social policies in Mexico City. In one of 
the most progressive public policy changes in the history of the country, the then Local 
Assembly passed the Civil-Union law for same sex couples to form a legal union and 
allowing abortions to be carried out and paid for by the local health ministry. For 
example, the first time a same sex civil union bill was presented was in 2001, failing 
due to the lack of support from the city’s mayor, the now president and devote 
evangelical Andrés Manuel López Obrador50, a process that repeated itself in 2003. 
These reforms sparked a strong, and sometimes controversial, reaction from ultra 
conservative groups and the higher echelon of the Catholic church in Mexico and even 
the Vatican. In this chapter I will attempt to conceptualize these groups in the theory 
of the contemporary far right and narrate how they transitioned from being private and 
secretive groups, to the forefront of the social debate in Mexico. In so, identifying one 
of the main characteristics of the far right in Mexico: their deep connection to religious 
conservatism, somehow in line with the Christian right of the United States or Poland 
but different in their origin, their place within the radical right family, historical acumen 
and secretive ways, but also their strong vocation as a social actor in their own 
communities.  
 
Just a bit over a month after abortion was legalized in Mexico City, the National 
Association of Catholic Lawyers presented a petition to the electoral authorities to carry 
out a binding referendum on the approved reform, the petition was dismissed because 
of their failure to gather the 36,000 signatures required by law to carry out such an 
 
50 “Sociedades de Convivencia festejan 10 años en la CDMX,” March 15, 2017, 
https://news.culturacolectiva.com/noticias/matrimonios-gay-cumplen-10-anos-en-el-df/. 
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initiative51. A few weeks later a string of protests, coordinated by different groups of 
the Mexican Catholic church, were carried out in different cities across the country. 
However, none of these protests were large in magnitude, as documented by the 
women’s rights association GIRE and local authorities52.  
 
As a general note, before we carry on with this work, it is noteworthy to explain that 
the media and informative documents included in this work, such as the report from 
GIRE, have been included in a general strategy to generate the social, political and 
cultural context in Mexico. While the highest degree of rigor was sought after in the 
sources included, the author, being from Mexico, also possesses research reflectivity 
in the prestige and validity of said sources.  
 
We proceed to identify something notable about these protests, it was not the lack of 
participation, but the origin of those who did participate that is relevant. According to 
Sánchez and Ubaldi, amongst the participants could be found the Knights Templar, the 
Knights of the Maltese Order, The Knights of Columbus, Cristo Rey Movement and 
the National Guard53. Most of these organizations and groups have been historically 
linked to the Catholic church in Mexico and can find their origins in the Cristero War 
of the early 20th century in which the Catholic church funded and promoted a popular 
uprising against the anti-religious government of the time, emanated from the secular 
laws of the 1917 Constitution54.  
 
Groups like the Knights of Columbus emanated from a popular conception of the 
Catholic Church in Mexico that saw it as not only a spiritual institution but also as a 
promoter of social work and was more in line with Christian Democratic ideas and 
socialism. These groups continued to be a support network for the rebellion until a 
 
51 Cf. María Luisa Sánchez Fuentes and Norma Ubaldi Garcete, eds., El proceso de despenalización 
del aborto en la Ciudad de México, 1. ed., 1. reimpr, Temas para el debate 7 (México, DF: Grupo de 
Información en Reproducción Elegida, GIRE, 2008). 
52 Ibid., 
53 Ibid., 
54Cf. “Cristero War,” accessed May 17, 2020, 
https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/c/Cristero_War.htm. 
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copular agreement was reached between the Catholic authorities in Mexico and the 
government in order to pacify the country. This agreement was seen as equivalent to 
treason by some of these groups and provoked a schism in the catholic organizations, 
giving birth to the two main sides of the historical right in Mexico: first, the National 
Action Party, with liberal and secular values; and second, the Sinarquist movement, 
which saw armed conflict as a valid strategy for achieving its religious goals, and has 
been historically linked to the Spanish Falange and the Franco regime55. In sum, it 
could be said that the common root of the political right in Mexico was the social 
vocation of the church and liberalism in opposition to religious freedom, positions 
radicalized by the far right and that today exist in organizations that carry that message 
forward such as do the above-mentioned groups.  
 
Moreover, Sinarquism has been historically considered to be the umbrella organization 
in which all far right, both radical and extreme right,  organizations use to operate and 
connect. Its ideological origin derives from the Rerum Novarum, a Catholic encyclical 
letter from Pope León XIII in which he intended to systematically oppose liberal 
secular doctrine. With this in mind Pope León attempted to launch a Christian democrat 
movement that would use political and social methods in order to achieve economic, 
spiritual, political, and social influence around the world56. The movement in Mexico, 
however, went beyond the Christian democrat ideas, with parts of it radicalizing in 
order to counter the also radical secular government of the time.  
 
As was mentioned before the movement began after the pacification of the country 
following the religious rebellions in the 1920’s and 1930’s57. “The Base”, as it was 
known, remained active and was composed of non-connected small cells of members 
organized by territory and profession. Its members swore allegiance to the Catholic 
church, even if the leadership remained composed of non-ordained members. Uribe 
 
55 Mónica Uribe, “La ultraderecha en México: el conservadurismo moderno,” n.d., 39-57 
56 González Flores and José Gustavo, “Los Motivos Del Sinarquista: La Organización y La Ideología 
de La Unión Nacional Sinarquista,” Culturales 3, no. 1 (June 2015): 49–76. 
57 Uribe, Ibid.,  
 38 
also makes the connection between the Fascist regimes in Europe and Sinarquism in 
Mexico, as a way for Germany, through Spain, to gather support and contain the United 
States. However, the religious differences and extreme catholic views of the Spanish 
Falange provoked Sinarquism to disassociate itself from them and follow its own 
path58.  
 
Although there existed outside elements interested in promoting Sinarquism and its 
ideology, the movement remained a popular movement of Catholics that promoted on 
the one side a stoic way of life, nationalism, private property and religious education; 
and on the other, the things it fought against, being communism, the revolution, and 
protestant “yankee” liberalism, its main ethereal enemies59.  
 
Despite its secretive modus operandi, Sinarquist leaders attempted to establish public 
political organizations on several occasions, however none of them became viable 
political forces. Salvador Abascal Infante, became leader of the National Sinarquist 
Union (UNS) in 1939, and was instrumental in the exponential growth of members, 
going from a few dozen to almost 250,000 in 1941. By 1946 the UNS split between 
two groups, one led by Carlos Athié Carrasco who advocated for education and social 
cooperatives; and the other a short-lived political party Frente Popular who went in 
alliance with the National Action Party (PAN). In 1948 the party lost its registry, and 
the movement went clandestine again60.  
 
The UNS became active again in the late 60’s, when the National Union of Parents was 
formed in response to the Cuban Revolution with the campaign “Christianism yes, 
Communism no”. In a way, setting the picture for a new attempt at a political party: 
the Mexican Democratic Party. Again, however, it was a short-lived effort as the party 
lost the registry a couple of years later in 198861. Finally, the UNS made one last 
 
58 Ibid., 
59 González Flores and José Gustavo, Ibid., 
60 Uribe, Ibid., 
61 Ibid., 
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attempt to form a political party in 2008, despite their efforts the minimum threshold 
for legal registry was not achieved and the registry was denied by the electoral authority 
in Mexico62. It is important to mention than, despite all these efforts to develop public 
political organizations the UNS and other far right groups have mostly operated in the 
shadows, under the cover of unions, business organizations, catholic organizations, and 
such63.  
 
The ideology of Sinarquism hasn’t changed much in the last few decades, however, 
there seems to be an important change in how the movement and leadership have 
accepted the democratic order as a legitimate way to gain power. According to the 
research made by Monica Uribe in the links between PAN, the national business 
community and the far right (Uribe defines these groups as extreme right, but a closer 
analysis shows that according to contemporary definitions they are more aligned to the 
radical right); it is possible to establish how the Sinarquist movement survived 
politically by the systematic infiltration of its members into PAN, and its youth 
movements. To the degree that Carlos Abascal, the son of the historic Sinarquist leader 
Salvador Abascal became Ministry of the Interior in Mexico during the first democratic 
government in 200064. Moreover, PAN local groups in the center-north of the country, 
area known as the Bajío, the historic cradle of Sinarquism and the Cristeros, have been 
taken over by sympathizers or members of the far right65. An example of this is the 
former governor of Guanajuato, Juan Carlos Romero Hicks, with links to secretive 
organization El Yunque, or Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, who became national leader of 
PAN66.  
 
There has been another seismic change in the relationship of far right organizations 
with society as a whole: they have become, somewhat, a part of public discourse. Two 
main reasons for this to have happened: first, a series of journalistic endeavors that had 
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unmasked the current activities of organizations such as El Yunque, linking them to 
non-governmental organization Hazte Oír in Spain, which even derived in criminal 
investigations because of their role in threatening the journalists doing research on 
them67; and second a new opportunity to polarize and galvanize their support in the 
context of legal reforms in different countries referring to abortion and same sex 
unions, as they have done in the past with issues such as opposition to communism.  
 
Derived of this public exposure came an unprecedented acceptance of their own 
existence by the current leadership of the organization. José Luis Castellanos López, 
former press secretary for the Ministry of Social Development and rector of the Vasco 
de Quiroga University in Michoacán, recognized the existence of the organization and 
gave a rare glimpse on the inside. He went as far as sharing the actual name as 
Organization for the Common Good, or just The Organization; he also explained the 
reason for its secrecy, and how it’s been based on humility of its members and security 
reasons68. Further ahead The Organization, or El Yunque will be used indistinctively.  
 
The Organization is probably one of the only cases in which a Christian radical right 
organization in Mexico can be properly comparable to the dynamics of the Christian 
right in the United States, albeit on a smaller scale. Fitzgerald and Provost document 
the deep link between Christian organization’s money in the United States and populist 
radical right organizations in Europe. Their explicit political vision seeks to take power 
away from women and LGBTQIA people, as well as promote anti-abortion initiatives, 
traditional gender roles and the freedom of institutions, specifically Christian ones, 
above the freedoms of others69.  
 
According to an Open Democracy investigation, Christian right organizations, some 
linked to the Trump administration and Steve Bannon, have sent over 50 million USD 
 
67 “El Yunque”, la sociedad paramilitar vinculada con HazteOír, cada vez menos secreta, n.d. 
68 El Yunque Reconoce Públicamente Su Existencia y Operación En Varios Países - Proceso Portal de 
Noticias, n.d. 
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of “dark money” into Europe over the last ten years. These contributions have been 
funneled to lawyers, political activists, as well as campaigns against LGBTQIA rights, 
sex education and abortion. More importantly these organizations seem to be linked 
increasingly to Europe’s populist radical right parties and organizations in Italy, 
Hungary, Poland, Spain and Serbia70. One of the biggest spenders include an 
organization led by Jake Sekulow, Donald Trump’s personal lawyer, and some of its 
bigger donors are famous conservative billionaires the Koch brothers. The links 
between these organizations and the European PPR were evident in the World Congress 
of Families in Verona, Italy; where politicians such as Mateo Salvini advocated for the 
type of Europe that “They like”71.  
 
The Organization has followed a similar path, on a smaller scale, in Spain and France. 
As mentioned above, The Organization has links to Spanish NGO HazteOír and similar 
collectives. These groups financed campaigns against abortion, equal marriage or the 
secularism of the Spanish state, especially during the government of Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero72. The links to The Organization have been clearly validated by 
Spanish courts  and their success was curtailed by opposition from moderate catholic 
groups and religious leaders73. According the investigation by journal El Plural, The 
Organization was exported from Mexico following the death of Francisco Franco, so 
Spain would again be ruled by religious values74.  
 
The internationalization of the Christian right in the US and the one in Mexico, seem 
similar in their objectives, however the scope of their activities remains distinct. On the 
one side the Christian Right in the US is attempting, under the protection and promotion 
of the Trump Administration and its operatives, to promote a change of regime in 
Europe, or at the very least to undermine the democratic institutions on what it is based 
on, under the guise of a Europe of Christian Values; on the other groups like The 
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Organization seem to be more in line with promoting Christian values because of their 
intrinsic benefit they believe they bring to society, there is not clear evidence if such 
organizations do have a link between the new rise of parties like Vox in Spain that 
could be a part of a wider populist radical right movement in the continent. It is 
important to note that unlike its US counterparts, The Organization has been operating 
in Spain for decades. 
 
In this section we’ve attempted to establish the historic roots for the Christian right in 
Mexico, and how it has evolved from its origins as a popular movement for religious 
freedom in the center of the country in the early XXth century to a secretive network 
of ultra conservative organizations and finally to embody a public discourse in 
opposition to progressive laws in Mexico City and the country. In a way there is a 
continuity and evolution in how far right parties have existed in Mexico for the past 
near 100 years, from the armed struggle to become legitimate players in the democratic 
game, albeit operating in the shadows, and now as banner holders for conservatism and 
their own conception of “family values”.  
 
Mudde defines of the main characteristics of the populist radical right as being 
authoritarian. In the case of the Mexican far right organizations it is clear that for a long 
time and as part of the opposition, they were advocates for democracy in the country 
to a certain degree. Its members, as part of PAN, were part of the transition to 
democracy. Their motives to be a part of the democratic transition remain unclear, but 
their role is hard to deny. The historical continuity, democratic advocacy and focused 
scope of action are some of the main traits that help identify some of these groups as 
the Christian radical right in Mexico.  
 
Where are the people? Far Right and the upper and middle class in Mexico 
 
Contemporary PRR parties and organizations rely heavily on a public discourse 
vilifying the elites and building an aura of being the “true” people. Often you can find 
these organizations building their base around working class folks who feel 
 43 
disenfranchised by economic growth, globalization, progressive changes, or the 
political system75. As true as this may be in other parts of the world, it does not seem 
to hold in Mexico. Historically the far right has emanated from a middle and upper 
class setting, in which conservative values seem to thrive. It’s also geographically 
localized to regions in which religious conservatism is deeper embedded in society, 
regions economically linked to industrial corridors, thriving middle classes and the 
opposition to the PRI rule for over 70 years.  
 
This is one of the main problems PRR parties and organizations find in Mexico, a lack 
of widespread support, as their historical ancestors haven’t possessed. In a country with 
such economic disparities, a political trend emanated from the economic elites, which 
historically might be different from the political elites of the day, might find a hard 
time finding growing support in the working classes.  
 
In order to establish a connection between the middle and upper classes in Mexico to 
the far right parties, organization and ideologies this chapter will focus on two different 
narratives: first, since we observe that the radical right and the center-right party PAN 
have been historically connected, it is possible to infer similar characteristics for their 
average voter, in this way, voting trends and the type of voter should suffice as a 
sufficient enough connection between middle and upper classes and the radical right 
and so, the populist radical right; and second, the author will try and make evident the 
profound connection of the far right parties and organizations with large money 
interests in Mexico, these groups have been funded and protected from the very top of 
the largest family fortunes in the country, as ways to further their agenda, oppose the 
government, communism or any type of progressive values.  
 
It is widely considered that the democratic transition began in Mexico in 1997 with the 
electoral reforms that allowed for proportional representation in Congress. Up until 
then, parties with a considerable vote were not able to win seats in the Chamber of 
 
75 Beauchamp, 2016 
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Deputies because the system of direct representation excluded them against the well-
oiled electoral machine of the one-party system led by PRI76.  
 
As shown in Table 1 there have been eight congressional elections in Mexico since 
1997, however the far right has only been represented in 4 of them, never reaching 
more than 3.3% of the popular vote. In Table 1 we can see the comparison between the 
share of the vote for far right parties and right/center-right parties in Mexico between 
1997 and 2018. The data shown below comes from secondary academic sources that 
syphon their raw data from the open tools from the National Electoral Institute INE, 
this in order to better visualize and interpret the information. The INE (previously IFE) 
is a trusted autonomous organization, tasked to handle and certify elections, they 
remain the top authority in electoral results; the secondary sources are hosted by the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico. These sources provide little risk to 
misinterpretation or falsified data. The information was systematized by year, 
percentage of the vote and historical connection of the parties to the far right as 
researched by the author. 
 
Table 1 Electoral Results of the Far Right and Right parties in Mexico 1997-2018 
  1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 
Far Right 
Parties 
0.60% 0.00% 0.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.30% 2.40% 
Right 
Parties 
25.90% 38.20% 30.70% 33.40% 28.00% 25.90% 21.00% 17.90% 
77 
The radical right party term is loosely used here, in order to accommodate for the 
different parties that emanated from the historical far right movement such as 
Sinarquism. Three parties have participated in said 4 elections: first, the Mexican 
Democrat Party(PDM), closely associated with the Sinarquism Movement, that had 
 
76 Vianello, n.d. 
77 Recursos Electorales En La Internet: Elecciones Federales En México - Consulta de Resultados, 
n.d. 
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previously lost its registry in 1988 but once again managed to participate in the election 
of 1997, reaching around 190,000 votes and 0.6% of the national vote for the Chamber 
of Deputies; second, Social Alliance Party (PAS), formed with the remains of the PDM 
and reaching a very similar vote share in the 2003 elections with 0.6% and around 
197,000 votes; and finally, third, the Social Encounter Party (PES), that participated in 
both the 2015 and 2018 elections, with far wider support that its predecessors reaching 
around 1.3 million votes in both elections, but losing its national registry for failing to 
reach the 3% threshold required by the electoral authorities.  
 
Regarding the PES, it is important to mention that this party does not fit the historic 
characteristics of radical right organizations in México. Firstly, it is a party heavily 
linked to Evangelical Christian groups, in contrast to Catholic organizations, also its 
leadership won’t accept the fact that the party is linked to any religious organization. 
However, they do promote positions against progressive values, women’s autonomy or 
abortion as a right, same-sex marriage, amongst others78. So, in a way they partake in 
similar contemporary vocal efforts as their catholic counterparts in the National Family 
Front or The Organization79. This last reason is why they have been included in this 
group.  
 
On the other side, the PAN, has been a steady player in the Mexican democratic system. 
The electoral reform of 1997 and clever bargaining with the government of the time 
allowed PAN to compete in the 2000 election with candidate Vicente Fox from a strong 
position. Thus, for the first time in Mexico’s contemporary history the PRI party was 
out of government and the democratic transition began80. PAN won 223 seats in the 
chamber of deputies with 38.2% of the vote, so far, it’s been their highest vote share 
until today.  
 
 
78 Partido Encuentro Social, n.d. 
79 Se Opone El PES a Validar El Aborto - El Sol de Tlaxcala, n.d.) 
80 La Transición Democrática En México | Internacional | EL PAÍS, n.d.) 
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In figure 1, we can see how from the victory in 2000 there’s a steady decline in the vote 
share of PAN in subsequent elections. From 38.2% to 30.7% in 2003, 33.4% in 2006, 
and so on. In the last major federal election in 2018, PAN only got 17.9% of the vote 
share for the Chamber of Deputies81. Two presidential administrations from 2000 to 
2012, plagued with scandals and mismanagements, chipped away the halo of PAN as 
the flag bearer for the democratic transition, and it set circumstances for a return of PRI 
and eventually for the victory of the now President Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
from the left leaning Movement for National Regeneration (MORENA)82.  
 
Figure 2 Vote share of the Chamber of Deputies elections for far right and right parties 1997-2018 
83 
 
The 2018 election provoked a seismic change in the political scenario in Mexico, in 
this regard there is still need for further research in the implications this had in party 
preferences. With this in mind, the author will attempt to further the hypotheses that 
PRR in Mexico is more focused in middle and upper classes, in two ways: first by 
giving a PAN voter profile based on the last legislative exclusive federal election of 
2015; and second, elaborating in how PAN stronghold electoral districts are located 
mostly on affluent and developed areas. 
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When the National Action Party was founded their main objective as a group was to 
create a viable opposition against the one-party system of PRI and its predecessors. 
The party was mostly made up of middle-class people, small business owners, 
professionals, catholic conservatives and businessmen84. At least until the 2015 
election some of the original sectors of the party seem to hold. The level of academic 
achievement for PAN voters is by far the highest of the main parties with 45% of voters 
who would prefer PAN in the election having studied in a University, compared to 29% 
for PRI and 13% for the Democratic Revolution party (PRD). Income also seems to be 
one of the main differences in voter characteristics, 58% of PAN voters find themselves 
in the higher income percentile with more than $20,000 MXN monthly income, in 
comparison to 27% for PRI and 9% for PRD85. 
 
Taking these two main characteristics, academic achievement and income we can 
further infer the profile of the regular PAN voter if we take into account the work by 
Luvianos and Aparicio (2005) in which they cross reference party electoral strongholds 
and economic and social development. Taking into account electoral results from 1997 
to 2003, it was found that PAN had their strongest support bases in 41 electoral districts 
out of 300, these districts were reliable and rarely switched. The authors generated a 5-
tier economic development chart, in which Levels 1 and 2 would be the most 
developed. Out of 41 districts, 32 of PAN strongholds belonged to the first and second 
levels of the chart, with the strongest support in Nuevo León, Coahuila, Sinaloa, 
Nayarit, Tamaulipas and Tabasco86. With these numbers we can comfortably build a 
general profile of the average PAN voter: economically affluent, educated and 
probably living in the north of the country.  
 
Having established a minimum floor for voter profiles for the right in Mexico, we can 
move on to specific connections between far right groups and the economic elites. 
Historically, the right and populist radical right in Mexico have found shelter and 
 
84 Tirado, 1985, pp. 107-108 
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resources in the middle and upper classes. PAN, Sinarquism and other populist radical 
right organizations share a complex and convoluted history in which they have thrived 
under the protection and promotion of the Catholic Church, the higher echelons of the 
business community such as the Confederation of Patrons of the Mexican Republic 
(COPARMEX), one of the fiercest business organizations in the country87, and other 
national and local business associations. It is important to note that the author was not 
able to establish any relevant connection between the far right and other mainstream 
parties in Mexico such as PRI or PRD, being PAN the only party with relevant links.  
 
After the Mexican Revolution and the establishment of the National Revolutionary 
Party and the Mexican Revolutionary Party, both antecessors of PRI, it was clear the 
business community in the Bajío and North of the country would be sidelined in the 
political process. However, these business sectors found in PAN and other 
organizations, channels to have influence in the political life of the country88. Being 
PAN the largest representative of the right in Mexico, this work focuses on its 
interconnections with the business communities. At the same time making evident the 
connections between the largest and more politically relevant business organizations 
and populist radical right organizations and parties. However, it is important to make 
emphasis on the fact that members of the far right have always been involved in the 
inner structures of the party, so the connections can be inferred. 
 
From the very beginning of PAN, it was clear their close relationship to capital, the 
party’s first national board consisted of 38% of bankers and businessmen according to 
author Ricardo Tirado (1985). Amongst the founding members of PAN, we could find 
the secretary of COPARMEX, Daniel Kuri Breña, and local COPARMEX leaders 
Isaac Guzmán Valdivia, who was also leader of the National Sinarquist Union, Antonio 
L. Rodriguez, founding member of COPARMEX, historic PAN figure and 
COPARMEX leader in 1930, Manuel Gómez Morín, amongst many others89.  
 
87 Tirado, 1985, pp. 107-108 
88 Ibid., 
89 Tirado,  Ibid., 
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As the 1960’s approached and the cold war cemented as the ideological battleground 
of the day, a number of new far right organizations emerged. Organizations such as the 
University Movement for Orientation and Renovation (MURO) which embodied the 
most virulent and violent of the extreme right of the day. MURO was a radical anti-
communist student organization; they were supported by a number of businessmen, 
particularly from Nuevo León, Coahuila and other parts of Northern Mexico90. Their 
main activities consisted in harassment of students, theft, counter-protesting, amongst 
others. One of the main promoters of MURO was businessman Hugo Salinas Price, 
founder of retail chain Elektra91, at some point he declared to have been directly 
involved in a student clash during the anniversary of the Cuban revolution in 1962, a 
clash that left several students gravely injured. Another relevant promoter of MURO 
was René Capistrán Garza, former Cristero leader, that used his newspaper Atisbos as 
a propaganda tool against the USSR and to promote MURO activities92. One of the 
darkest periods of MURO was in 1968, as they, ironically, became enablers and 
promoters of the government’s repression on the massive student movement 
demanding political freedoms; movement that found its climax in the massacre of 
Tlatelolco on the 2nd of October, date remembered to this day with protests and 
memorials93.  
 
MURO leadership kept close ties with other far right organizations, like the National 
Sinarquist Union and the National Union of Parents; they are also closely linked to el 
Yunque or The Organization94. It is important to mention that there’s an in going 
discussion between scholars since it is not clear if MURO evolved and thus The 
Organization was founded, or if MURO was just a part of The Organization itself. 
MURO operatives went as far as participating in terrorist plots in lieu of international 
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anti-communist groups against newspapers in Florida in 1965 believed to be 
collaborators with the Cuban regime in Havana95.  
 
In this section the author has tried to establish clear connections between specific 
demographic segments in Mexico, as well as historical processes to the far right. On 
the one hand exposing the link that has existed amongst the different right and far right 
groups and parties such as PAN, PAS, MURO, The Organization, and others. On the 
other hand, tried to define a minimum general profile of the PAN voter, them being 
affluent, educated and living in specific areas of the country, in a way that we could 
extrapolate those characteristics for the right and the far right as a whole, further 
validating the hypothesis that the far right and the PRR in Mexico are not well 
established in the working and lower classes. There is little academic research on the 
populist radical right in Mexico, but these connections should suffice to establish the 
clear intersections between the established and systemic political right, the business 
communities ,the far right embodied by radical groups and shadowy organizations, and 
perhaps the recent developments that point into an incipient populist radical right.  
 
These characteristics and interdependence between the above-mentioned groups, 
probably wouldn’t mean much on their own. However, when framed inside specific 
political and historical processes, they attain new significance. Political exclusion, and 
minority oppression, even when it comes from radical religious communities, can lead 
to specific acts of rebellion and the creation of viable oppositions. The sidelining of 
specific groups in Mexico by the one-party system, specifically of businessmen non-
aligned with the regime, and conservative forces that opposed center-left policies 
seemed to have created a good enough brewing ground for populist radical right forces 
to subsist. Middle and upper classes disenfranchised with the government of the day 
agglutinated around number of oppositions from which PAN was the most successful, 
but not the only one. Radical right groups were also a vocal enough force to be 




political groups; some of its members, mostly from affluent and powerful families, 
even went as far as to be part of future administrations during the democratic transition 
in Mexico96.   
 
The Far Right in Mexico today 
Victorious left and the echoes of white anxiety during the Obama years in the 
political transition in Mexico 
 
Much like on the night of Barack Obama’s victory in 2008, there was a joyful air of 
excitement in many parts of Mexico the night Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the 
presidential elections in 2018 as the live feed from the streets of Mexico City following 
the victory announcement showed. It was his third and final attempt, after almost 15 
years of continuous campaigning around every single electoral district in the country. 
Crowds gathered and cheered on the streets to see the official convoy going from 
campaign headquarters to his victory speech in the Zocalo of Mexico City, he gave a 
message of hope, change, and much needed justice in a country that had been struggling 
with poverty, violence and corruption for decades97.  
 
The campaign was fierce, especially on social media, where both sides deployed a 
myriad of resources, bots and fake news, in order to vilify or promote one or another 
candidate. The fear from the  economic elites of Andrés Manuel López Obrador has 
been documented in slogans such as -He is a danger for Mexico- as his discourse about 
change would for sure interfere with their economic interests98.  
 
Not only was the excitement similar to Obama’s but also the strong reactions against. 
Large economic, political, and social interests in Mexico have found renewed energy 
to oppose the new administration, not only on ideological and economic terms, but also 
racially and perhaps even class-wise. Polarization has been one of the main 
 
96 Mónica Uribe, “La ultraderecha en México: el conservadurismo moderno,” n.d., 49-50. 
97 Animal Político, 2018 
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characteristics of the new political context, not only fired up by the opposition, but also 
from the presidential palace. If the far right in Mexico lacks characteristics of populism 
because of their elite origins, the political elites, now in power, certainly seem to be 
more in line with it.  
 
In order to illustrate the main point of this chapter the author will make a comparison 
between the reaction from a certain segment of the white population in the United 
States after the victory of Barack Obama, and the reaction from certain sectors of the 
economic elites in Mexico after the victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The 
author will attempt to establish the main characteristics of these groups, going in depth 
into racial perception, issues and conflict, as well as look into the connections between 
opposition groups and parties with far right organizations. This in order to compare the 
perception of white anxiety, understood as the racial bias derived from a perceived loss 
of majority by Whites and how this affects their reaction to demographic or power 
relation changes,99 and the rise of radical right populism in the United States, and the 
perceived, albeit seemingly small, contemporary rise of populist radical right groups in 
Mexico.  
 
If one were to watch mass media in the United States on the weeks leading to the 2008 
election, racial differences as such would hardly be mentioned in a negative light; the 
country seemed to be riding on a wave of post-racism in which Obama’s apparent 
victory would cement that evolution for good. However, research carried out in the 
month prior to the election showed that around one third of white voters was troubled 
by the idea of Barack Hussein Obama to become the first black President of the United 
States100. The embedded prejudices against black people such as being lazy, 
unpatriotic, susceptible to commit crimes, and others, seemed to remain101.  
 
 
99 Craig & Richeson, 2014, pp. 750-759 
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Crucially, this study discounted for variables such as party preference (being a 
democrat or a republican), or if they perceived Obama to be fair in his role as a policy 
maker. A black president went against what was socially desirable for certain voters 
and thus generating negative anxiety emotions that would mean, even if the candidate 
were to be fairhanded in his policies, voters might be influenced by some latent racial 
attitudes that otherwise might have remained dormant102. It is important to note that 
when social desirability is involved, the idea of a black president can either be positive 
or negative. The main take of this study is that emotions can play a very important role 
in a voter’s decision at the polling stations, depending on what the desires of said voter 
for society are; and that excitement and enthusiasm can help overcome racial concerns, 
just as anxiety can increase them, especially when said voters identify with 
conservatism103.  
 
This white anxiety on its own would be a little piece of a larger political system, with 
negative effects surely but not enough to provoke the kind of backlash seen during the 
Obama presidency. It could be said that this Obama effect in white conservatives in the 
US is but the latest itinerancy of regular reactions by the far right that seek to stop social 
change by any means necessary104. A similar backlash took place during the Civil rights 
movement in the 1960s, or the Americanism in the 1920s, and we can see some of the 
same players such as the Ku Klux Klan making their comeback105. It is important to 
mention that this current episode did not begin with Obama’s victory, but perhaps with 
the fear and anxiety infused by the Tea Party in American politics, spilling over inside 
the Republican party and further pushing them to the right106.  
 
It could be said that racism in Mexico is even older than in the United States, we can 
find it in the establishment of the New Spain as a colony and the need to justify the 
economic and exploitation of indigenous communities, African slaves and its 
 
102 Redlawsk et al., 2010, p. 885 
103 Ibid., 
104 Ornstein & Mann, 2012, in Parker, 2016, pp. 3-27 
105 Ibid., 
106  Ibid., 
 54 
descendants107. Furthermore, during the next few centuries of colonial rule, this 
hierarchical racism, linked to specific ancestries was institutionalized in a caste system 
that forbade the mix between races. It was during that time that the belief of the 
superiority of the European descendances was developed and promoted which 
legitimized their important material advantages over other racial groups108.   
These advantages seem to continue to this day; based on a national survey, a recent 
study managed to identify the profound differences between whites (of European 
descendance) and people of color in México. White people seem to be on the higher 
end of the academic achievement, followed by light brown skinned people (LB), in the 
bottom dark brown skinned people (DB) and people who speak an indigenous language 
(ILS). Whites come on top of the probability of being business owners, in contrast DB 
people have a higher probability of being part of the informal economic sector109. DB 
people also mention more frequently to have been discriminated against because of 
their accent or skin color; thus, more DB people think their human rights have not been 
respected, in contrast to white people who mention their human rights not being 
respected the least. There is a similar scenario in access to public space and public 
services, where DB people mentioned more often not being accepted in hospitals or 
schools, followed by LB people and finally whites110. Moreover, it is important to 
mention how the value of one race or color over the other seems to have been 
internalized since the likeability rate for DB and LB people over the general population 
seems to be considerably lower than that of the white population; meaning that DB and 
LB people seem to also favor the notions of white people and the idea that they do not 
have the same value because from that physical characteristic111. This study carried out 
by the Autonomous University of Mexico was executed by Mexican social scientists 
for the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO), research institution 
devoted to Latin American studies formed by 18 member states. While this study could 
fall victim of racial vias the methodology followed, and peer review ensured the 
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academic rigor of its findings. This work is also relevant for its focus on Latin America, 
giving it additional validity in the context of this work. Similar academic approaches 
have been followed in the use of other data sets. 
 
It is remarkable, that somehow, and despite having more political influence and access 
to wealth, there’s a portion of white people in the United States that perceive 
themselves as victims of a changing demographic composition in their own country 
and so a shift in power. Being, political correctness, reverse discrimination, Latin-
American immigration, or the mass media, they appear to see themselves as under 
attack112. However, if we were to connect this white anxiety with the reaction a part of 
society in Mexico is having against the López Obrador administration, racial 
considerations, as relevant as they are, would not show the whole picture.  
 
Hence, the scholar needs to rely on the argument made by Luigi Esposito, in which he 
links white anxiety directly to the challenge made towards a set of neoliberal values, 
that have worked transversally to maintain racial and social inequalities; it is a similar 
argument to the one made by Norris and Inglehart in the way that the spread of social 
liberal values generates a feeling of being threatened between traditionalists in fear of 
their core values and social stance being eroded113. In this argument it is possible to 
find common ground between the Mexican and the United States’ case. First, Esposito 
mentions how Obama’s economic policies aimed to regulate and enhance the federal 
structures were perceived as an attack of neoliberal and free market principles, thus 
reinforcing assumptions about white victimhood in the United States; second, that the 
public discourse about neoliberal values, linked to notions of a post-racial United 
States, and assumptions of self-reliance and the need to treat everyone as individuals, 
furthers current structures of racial inequality that are sustained and normalized; and 
finally, third, that if a serious effort ought to be carried out to challenge racial inequality 
there would be a specific need to engage critically with neoliberalism, not only as an 
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economic policy but also as a set of public values114. I will address these three points 
in regard of the first year of government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and in that 
way build a connection between the triggers of white anxiety in the US and those that 
seem to be igniting the far right in Mexico today.  
 
We begin on the main economic policies of the new government: first, the labor reform, 
carried out in the context of the new commercial treaty due to replace the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, whose main purpose was to enhance democracy in 
labor unions, increase salaries in specific sectors, and finally, include historically 
forgotten segments such as house maids into the social security schemes; second, the 
cancellation of the new airport for Mexico City, one of the symbols of the previous 
administration that jeopardized over 300,000 million pesos (around 16 billion USD of 
the day) in public expenditure, setting up the stage for a major confrontation with the 
private sector, who would receive most of that investment in government contracts, and 
would-be users of said airport; third, an array of austerity measures that would cancel 
or diminish a number of government programs and contracts, effectively provoking a 
technical recession and cooling off the Mexican economy; fourth, the major investment 
program for the state oil company PEMEX, while suspending private contracts for oil 
exploration and exploitation, making clear the private sector would not be able to go 
ahead with a number of planned investments in deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and 
other areas115; fifth, the reorientation of around 25 billion USD from public expenditure 
towards economic transfers via social programs116; and finally, sixth, an effective 
campaign against tax evasion, that would bring extra thousands of millions of pesos, 
mainly from the top corporations in the country117.  
 
It could be argued that some of these policies would have a direct negative impact on 
the economic expectations of people on the higher percentiles of the income 
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distribution index, it is important to note that half of the current income in Mexico is 
concentrated in just 20% of the households118; usually identified with lighter skin119. 
This while at the same time having a very direct and tangible positive impact on the 
lower income households, around 41,9% that live in poverty120, usually identified with 
darker skin tones. While there is no direct data to fully corroborate the assumption that 
white people hold most of the wealth in the country, there is a myriad of indirect 
indicators such as the mentioned above about academic prowess, percentage of people 
in managerial positions, and participation in the economically active population, that 
would justify such an inference. Therefore, making the connection between some 
economic policies and the feeling of being victimized by a government that is trying to 
redirect public policies from favoring a specific economic minority, traditionally linked 
with white people is more than plausible. And in so, creating some of the conditions 
that can brew a degree or far right ideas and dynamics. 
 
So, the question remains, why do the economic elites in Mexico have internalized the 
values of neoliberalism to such a degree that it is now part of their class identity? For 
this we must revisit the origins of neoliberal policies in Mexico, first introduced during 
the De la Madrid (1982-1988) and Salinas (1988-1944) administrations121. The core 
principles of neoliberalism in Mexico were: first, it was seen as an instrument to 
decrease the inflationary tendency of the Mexican Economy; second, liberalization of 
the market from government intervention; third, it allowed foreign investment; fourth, 
it diminished the power of unions and decreased some benefits of the working class. 
More importantly, the economic reforms and trade deals, such as NAFTA, that came 
with these new paradigms, were sold to the public as Mexico’s grand entrance into the 
coveted group of developed countries, and away from the continuous economic crisis 
of the 1970s and 1980s122.  
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However, the development promised by neoliberalism in Mexico came heavily 
distorted; during the De La Madrid administration, salaries lost 50% of their purchase 
power, millions became unemployed, while at the same time the 300 richest 
businessmen had record earnings between 1982-1988123. Rural communities and 
farmers neglected with no government subsidies became victims of speculative prices 
by distributors who managed to get a hold on the food staples market124. Overall, the 
Gini coefficient to measure inequality, went up from 0.54 in 1989 to almost 0.56 at the 
height of the neoliberal period in 1996125. It is possible to observe here how upper 
classes benefited from neoliberal policies, as well as middle classes to a certain degree.   
 
It is also possible to observe the social desirability of White people in the United States, 
linked to an image of the white, Anglo-Saxon, protestant, free market sort of country, 
an echo of the same desirability in the middle and upper classes in Mexico seems to 
exist. Who have been promised a grand entrance into the developed world, even if on 
the backs of their fellow poorer Mexicans126. These differences and promises between 
how benefited certain segments of the population were or were to be by neoliberal 
policies might be enough proof on how these paradigms could have been internalized 
by large swaths of the middle and upper classes in Mexico. Saying it in blunt terms – 
if it’s good for me, it must be good, and anything that goes against it must be bad-.  
 
So, as the new administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador enters in with strong 
support from lower income households127, a public discourse of -first the poor people-
as the campaign slogan from AMLO in the 2018 election stated, and the power and 
will to enforce those views into the federal budget, opposition was soon to follow. One 
of the most controversial decisions, was the cancellation of the new airport for Mexico 
City, and ongoing project with 30% of completion128. If the fact that only 30% of 
 
123 Ibid., pp. 43-44 
124 Ibid., pp. 44-47 
125 García, n.d. 
126 México Llega al Primer Mundo | Edición Impresa | EL PAÍS, n.d. 
127 María, n.d. 
128 Corona, 2018 
 59 
people in Mexico have ever traveled by air is taken into account, it comes as no surprise 
that those numbers intersect with income pattern129, and the cancellation of the building 
of the airport would affect a very specific income bracket. 
 
In this chapter I have showcased racial issues in the United States and Mexico, and 
how they have a strong connection to economic paradigms. While the patterns might 
not seem immediately obvious to the reader, when taking the previously drawn up 
picture in mind, we can identify economic and anxiety patterns here and there. It is true 
the lack of literature makes it difficult to fully and scientifically proof some of these 
assumptions, given the social and cultural charge of some of them we can rely on the 
reader’s discretion in valuing them.  
 
So far, the scholar has established the common characteristics of the Mexican far right 
and the contemporary populist radical right, their historical context, their lack of a large 
popular support base, and some the conditions in which them seem to be “growing” 
today. Further ahead the scholar will further explain one of the main obstacles these 
groups run into when attempting to grow and recruit. Finally, continue to elaborate on 
the contemporary groups and the causes they seem to defend and promote.  
 
No migration, no problem: Mexican xenophobia as the missing link between the 
populist radical right and power 
 
Having discussed the history and some of the characteristics of the far right in Mexico, 
we must proceed to begin the more specific conceptualization of the populist radical 
right in the country. Populist radical right groups today, find in Mexico a very specific 
set of circumstances that make recruiting and growing harder, than in most other 
countries with comparable economic indicators of inequality. In this chapter the author 
will addresses two general phenomenon that define Mexican attitudes towards one of 
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the populist radical right main dogmas: nativism130. First the scholar will address 
migration, both from the statistical point of view to explain how migration into Mexico 
has remained small in numbers and the fact that in Mexico there exists a complicated 
relationship with migration, in part attributed to Mexican migration to the United States 
and Mexico being mostly a country of transit; and second, I will make the case for 
multiculturalism in the Mexican social and political construct, and narrate how the 
Mexican Government has made a sustained effort since the early twentieth century to 
solidify the idea of a single nation and has established specific public policies to this 
end, creating the idea of Mexicaness but at the same time encouraging multiculturalism 
in order to promote cohesion in a culturally and racially diverse country.  
 
In order to establish the relationship between migration and the rise of radical right 
populism the author must look, first, into the European political scenario in the last 
twenty years. The European Union and the Schengen area have brought an 
unprecedented freedom of movement and labor across the continent; however, a 
number of unintended consequences have taken hold in the social and political 
structures of the region that have been used to explain the rise of populist radical right 
parties and organizations within the democratic process131. In a study carried out 
between 2002 and 2017 in 15 of the largest countries in Europe, a significant direct 
correlation between an increase in migration and the rise of populist radical right parties 
in elections could be found. This numbers when adjusted to socio-economic indicators 
revealed that unemployed and rural voters are more susceptible to vote for radical right 
and PRR parties than its urban and employed counterparts132. For context, it is 
important to mention the actual percentage of migrant population in some of these 
countries, for example: at the end of 2018, 17.9% of the population of Germany was 
foreign-born; 14.9% of Estonian population, 13.9% of Spanish, 10.4% of Italian, 
19.1% of Finnish, 2% of Polish and 5.8% of Hungarian133. The study concludes 
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reflecting in how migration policies and influxes have the potential to disrupt political 
equilibriums and that continued rapid immigration into a certain country can foster 
support for populist radical right parties and the xenophobic, ethno-nationalist 
identities that support them134. While some criticism can be expressed for the 
methodology in which these correlations were found, the general findings seem to be 
sound enough for use in this work, the academic rigor of the authors contributes to the 
acceptability of the results. 
 
In a sharp contrast to these European countries, there are only 1.06 million foreign-
born residents in Mexico. In a country with a population of around 126 million, that’s 
equivalent to around 0.85% in 2019135. The largest groups from these are from the 
United States with 71%, Guatemala with 4.16% and Spain with 2.22%, followed 
closely by Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. Mexico ranks 162 in the list of 
countries by percentage of foreign-born residents136. More importantly the share of 
population who are immigrants in the country has not been steady in the last 25 years: 
from 1990 to 1995 it decreased from around 695,000 to around 458,000, only to 
increase erratically until 2017 to almost 1.2 million and begin a decreasing rate 
onwards. Just between 2017 and 2019 it decreased from .99% of the population, the 
highest percentage in more than 30 years, to 0.85%137. 
 
Despite these numbers, however, one in three Mexicans believe there’s too many 
immigrants in Mexico138. Mexicans seem to be at odds with themselves when it comes 
to feelings about emigration and immigration. For the next series of statistics, rely on 
the information from studies carried out by polling agency Parametria in 2006, a study 
by Meseguer and Maldonado in 2015, Defoe Consultancy in 2018, and a poll by 
national newspaper El Universal in 2019, it is important to mention that these datasets 
are generated by recognized polling and media companies, that adhere to minimum 
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standards of credibility, however standard error margins persist. Overall, these results 
paint a picture pretty much in line with immigration feeling trends in more developed 
countries but with specific particularities for the Mexican case, these being a path of 
transmigration to the United States, and the small numbers of foreign-born residents in 
the country.  
 
According to Parametria, 46% of Mexicans felt very much or somewhat related to 
migrants from Central America, 62% of Mexicans have the opinion that the federal 
government should decrease migration into Mexico, while at the same time 41% of 
people think the government mistreats migrants139. Meseguer and Maldonado elaborate 
and align their results with similar results in developed countries with higher 
immigration rates, they conclude social factors have greater influence in attitudes than 
economic factors, however education does not have a significant influence in attitude, 
in contrast to developed countries academic achievement does not have a correlation 
to acceptance of diversity140.  
 
Adding to these results, the study carried out by Defoe Consultancy goes one step 
further and includes some opinions on emigration from Mexico to the United States. 
43% of respondents believed emigration to the US was higher than 2017, albeit they 
are almost equally divided in their positive or negative opinion towards it (31% vs 
33%). Generally, Mexicans believe immigrants are worsening the situation in food, 
music and arts (35%), work opportunities (49%), economy in general (52%), crime 
(50%). On the other hand, 28% believe immigrants are better workers than Mexicans, 
against 44% that believe it’s the same and 9% worse workers. Despite these beliefs, 
62% of Mexicans don’t think they discriminate against immigrants141. 
 
Overall, these results help explain, the complex feelings in Mexico towards migration. 
On the one hand almost half of Mexicans feel related to central American immigrants, 
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which is the second largest group overall in the foreign-born population, but they feel 
they should not be coming in large numbers, that the government should do something 
in that order, but also almost half recognize the government mistreats migrants. Being 
more educated does not influence your attitudes towards migrations, further proven by 
the fact that immigrants are considered hard workers but at the same time bad for the 
economy. Moreover, almost half of respondents had negative views on immigrants 
regarding crime rates, moral and values, music and arts, etc., while at the same time an 
overwhelming 62% believe they do not discriminate against them.  
 
However, this ambivalence might be about to change for the worse: the phenomenon 
of the Migrant Caravans from Central America seems to be playing a key role in the 
profound worsening of attitudes against migrations in the Mexican social sphere, much 
like the 2015 migration crisis in Europe. Historically, migrants traveling through 
Mexico have made so in small groups, sometimes being smuggled by organized 
criminal gangs142. However, deep economic crisis and droughts in the north of Central 
America, added to political pressures in the United States to fight illegal migration from 
the south, created the conditions for a new way of migrant travel to appear. Thousands 
of central American migrants, organized by social media, started traveling by foot, 
together in very large groups, in order to remain safe and take advantage of their 
numbers as they approached migratory authorities both in Mexico and the United 
States143.  
 
This situation created a visible crisis, enlarged by the media in both sides of the border. 
Pictures of thousands of migrants overflowing border controls, and rioting, quickly 
became staples of news shows and social media144. The visibility of the caravans had a 
quick impact in attitudes in Mexico towards migration: Mexicans seem to be more 
aware of the presence of central American migrants in the country, while in 2018 45% 
admitted seeing them in their communities, 52% did in 2019; 60% think central 
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American migrants damage their communities in 2019, a 24% increase from 2018; and 
finally, while in 2018 37% of people were against migrants being let into the country, 
in 2019 that number rose to 62%145. While these numbers seem dramatic, the nature of 
the caravans makes it difficult to extrapolate general attitudes towards immigrants in 
Mexico, however they work well as a warning of how immigration can disrupt the 
political and social context of a country in a dramatic way. Additional data from 2020 
would be useful to observe if the feelings remain or are just a product of media coverage 
of the caravans. It is also relevant to mention that the caravans have for the most part 
stopped since the beginning of 2020. 
 
As a reaction to these caravans, something extraordinary happened in Tijuana, as over 
5,000 migrants gathered in the city before attempting to cross into the United States: 
an anti-migrant protests sparked near one of the temporary shelters provided by the city 
government; a few hundred people, organized on social media and gathered to try and 
storm the migrant shelter, stopped by police in riot-gear, they chanted against migrants, 
and “the invasion” as they called it in their chants during the protest146. It is believed 
the protest was organized by the National Mexican Front (FNM), a contemporary 
extreme right group, working mostly in internet forums, much like its counterparts in 
the US and Europe147. 
  
The FNM is a self-described nationalist group, that uses national-socialist 
paraphernalia and aims to reject the United States illegal occupation of northern 
Mexico, derived from the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty of 1848 in which Mexico was 
coerced into the sale of massive amounts of territory. The group also supports the 
reinstatement of the Second Mexican Empire (1864 -1867) and the incorporation of 
Central America into Mexico. However, the group came into spotlight in the context 
of the Migrant Caravans, as they organized protests in different parts of the country; 
these protests have been met with a significant opposition, linking their discourse to 
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Donald Trump’s stance on migrants148. Despite their best efforts, groups like the FNM 
have not found prosperous breeding grounds for their anti-migrant rhetoric.  
 
The argument made here, for that lack of potential support, is that multiculturalism is 
embedded in the Mexican social and political construct. Mainly derived from specific 
socio-cultural characteristics and the active participation of the state in the context of 
nation-building after the Mexican Revolution. According to historian Alejandra 
Moreno Toscano, Mexican multiculturalism comes originally from the type of non-
elitist community relations developed prior to the arrival of the Spanish to the 
continent, relationships that were allowed to continue during the colonial times, 
enshrined by the cast system, in which indigenous communities were allowed self-
government and autonomy, as long as they converted to Catholicism149; this acceptance 
of indigenous customs persists until today with self-rule in a number of communities 
in modern day Mexico. She goes on to include the different waves of immigrants from 
Europe and Asia, some of them on their way to the United States, that were allowed to 
establish themselves in central and northern Mexico, immigrants that also held a degree 
of autonomy and the capacity to retain their cultural identity150. The degree of 
autonomy went as far as, perhaps  to spark the Cristero wars when the Mexican 
Government attempted to regulate the Catholic faith, which was a large part of their 
cultural identity. 151 
 
Dr. Moreno Toscano also explains how the need for the construction of the Mexican 
Nation-State did not allow leaders of the time to reflect on the ideological 
contradictions it could have on local communities. Instead, choosing not to interfere 
with cultural identities or customs, looking for homogenization of the Mexican self, 
but allowing a multiplicity of cultural identities beneath. In stark contrast to the 
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integrationism followed in the United States where the individual was king, in Mexico 
communities were prioritized152.  
 
It could be said that the main scenario where the Mexican state has promoted 
multicultural policies over the years has been education. It began as the new state was 
being formed after the Mexican revolution, when José Vasconcelos was appointed 
Secretary of Education, Vasconcelos was an intellectual, philosopher and writer, part 
of the Youth Atheneo club, where a number of contemporary intellectuals began153. 
Vasconcelos’ ideas about the mixing of races as a natural, and aesthetically positive, 
path for humanity, heavily influenced the notion of mestizaje, the product of the mix 
of European and indigenous races in Mexico, that produced a superior being: the 
cosmic race154.  
 
Under his tenure of the Education Secretariat (SEP), policies aimed at integrating 
indigenous people into the new mestizo nation were implemented. This was a process 
of planned culturization of indigenous communities in order to integrate and 
modernize. They used bilingual cultural promotors and teachers, that used indigenous 
languages in order to slowly transition children into Spanish155. While these policies 
did not aim at a multicultural society per se, however, they did establish the 
groundwork for such an effort in the future, as well as gave a degree of value to 
indigenous culture and languages.  
 
It was clear by the 1970s that the policies had failed in their objective of integration, 
and where eventually revised to include the perspectives of indigenous communities 
all over Mexico. In 1978 SEP reorganized its bilingual programs to include a bicultural 
perspective and created the General Directorate for Indigenous Education. In this 
context, it was indigenous leaders who promoted the idea of multiculturalism, and the 
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use of community relations in order for teachers to become more active in this effort, 
not only in education, but also in culture and local economies156. These efforts seemed 
to be more successful than the previous integration-aimed policies, however they still 
lacked enough resources and manpower to be fully applied nationwide.  
 
Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s, came the last leg of multicultural public policies 
implemented from the government. As the large government structures were being 
dismantled under the context of neoliberal reform, the new push for multiculturalism 
came from outside Mexico, as new global institutions, like the World Bank, demanded 
public policy approaches that protect cultural diversity, while at the same time land 
privatization, amongst other economic reforms, went against these very 
communities157. However, it is important to mention that the neoliberal reforms did 
provoke the open recognition of the country as culturally diverse and the existence of 
a great number of languages, identities and in a way, nations; process that reached a 
turning point in 1992 with the reform to article of the Constitution recognizing Mexico 
as a pluricultural nation158.  
These reforms provoked a renewed movement amongst indigenous communities in 
order to demand recognition of their collective rights. Groups such as the National 
Indigenous Council (CNI) were formed in order to better negotiate and represent 
indigenous people159. This process erupted when the Zapatist National Liberation 
Army, took arms against the government in the city of San Cristobal the 1st of January 
of 1994, reclaiming the defense of indigenous collective rights160. As the rebellion 
ended with the signing of the San Andrés Larrainzar Agreements the government, via 
the legislative branch, launched a new set of measures and policies in order to enshrine 
in law special protections for indigenous collective rights and citizen’s cultural 
identity161.  
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It could be said that a new breed of nationalism has emerged in Mexico, one that has 
multinationalism embedded at its core. The recognition of the indigenous people in 
Mexico, and the inclusion of this recognition in the Constitution, goes beyond the 
authoritarian and homogeneous system that exhausted in the late 1980s. Furthermore, 
the new three characteristics of the Mexican State emerge as democracy, globalization 
and multinationalism162.  
 
In this section, the author has established two distinct characteristics of Mexico that 
create a difficult scenario for populist radical right groups and organizations to grow. 
The lack of a large migrant population added to a complex set of feelings about 
immigration and emigration deny PPR groups and parties to foster support and use rally 
around the flag tactics for recruitment. This added to very specific social and political 
historical constructs depicted above around culture and identity promoted by decades 
of conscious efforts by the government, that in a way promote the idea of 
multiculturalism as a primordial part of what it is to be Mexican in the first place, even 
if at some stages their results were limited.  
 
This rough terrain for PRR groups is not a specific characteristic of the PPR in Mexico, 
but it helps to explain how Mexico has been able to avoid the rise of said groups. In a 
way, echoing multicultural positive public policies in Canada, that actively deny PRRs 
of public platforms, but at the same time in an opposite situation in which Canada 
actually has high levels of immigration from all over the world163. In a sense, Mexico 
protects historic communities via a multicultural approach, while Canada, protects its 
contemporary national construction via similar policies. 
 
While Mexico is not a country of immigration to the degree of Germany, Spain or the 
United Kingdom, it could be susceptible to political and social changes derived from 
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immigration policies just as many countries in Europe, as we could see with the 
reaction to the Migrant Caravans between 2018 and 2020. However, it would be 




































Analysis and Comparison 
Fundamentals of the Mexican Far Right 
 
Having done an extensive review of the historical process that the far right has followed 
in Mexico; from its earliest inception in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution, to 
its contemporary expressions such as the PRR; focusing in the 2008-2019 period, it is 
possible to identify a number of characteristics for the far right in Mexico, while 
extrapolating them to the populist radical right given the incipient stage it is in: first, 
the far right in Mexico today has a very clear link to Catholic underground groups that 
advocated for freedom of religion, this links have survived until today and they shape 
the tactics, objectives and nature of most of these groups; second, there is no 
widespread popular support for the far right in the country, moreover its support base 
is focalized in medium and higher income households, undermining its expansion 
strategies, albeit politically they have not always been a part of the elite; third, far right 
in Mexico does not seem to adopt a nativist ideology for the most part, despite localized 
recent and historical efforts to exploit the issue; and finally, fourth, far right groups and 
organizations in Mexico have chosen to operate, for the most part, within the 
democratic system, opting instead to either form their own parties, with little success, 
or infiltrate existing and successful political parties to further their agenda. 
 
We begin by briefly assessing the historical process of the far right in Mexico. As 
developed in the first section of this work we can observe a direct connecting line 
between groups that were formed in response to the secular Constitution of 1917 and 
those of the far right in Mexico today164 .Historical research allows us to pinpoint most 
the origins of the historical far right movement in Mexico to Sinarquism, that would 
eventually become the umbrella organizations from which most of the groups 
emanated. Sinarquism is a byproduct of the covert underground group known as “The 
Base” that continued to operate after the religious rebellions, also known as the Cristero 
Wars, ended. This movement would eventually produce a number of short-lived 
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political parties in the 40s such as the UNS and Frente Popular165, none of them 
successful. 
 
Having failed in producing a long-lived political party, the movement became active 
again in the 60s by forming some of the public non-governmental organizations that 
still operate today, such as National Union of Parents or the Catholic Lawyers 
Association (López, 2018, pp. 177-178). Around that same time another byproduct of 
Sinarquism was founded, The Organization as is known to its members, group that 
remains active and just recently has become openly acknowledged by its leader166. It is 
some members of this organization who have been the most successful in occupying 
office in subsequent PAN governments in Mexico and even controlling the national 
leadership of the party posterior to the democratic transition in Mexico167. Finally, it is 
Sinarquism emanated organizations that jumpstarted the current wave of activity of far 
right in Mexico: first, in opposition to progressive laws in Mexico City embodied 
eventually in the FNF as a radical right group, and now embodied by the most visible 
group: Frente Nacional (FRENA) who oppose the current left-government in the 
country168, this last group could be considered part of the populist radical right family. 
 
As we observe this links between the origins of far right in Mexico and its 
contemporary expressions, we can also observe some echoes of its original goals and 
objectives. The ideological origin of the movement being linked to the Rerum Novarum 
encyclical from Pope León XIII in which a crusade to achieve economic, spiritual, 
political and social influence was launched169. Added to the values promoted by 
Sinarquism like private property, nationalism, religious education and a fervent 
opposition to communism and liberalism170.  
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Different iterations of far right parties and organizations in Mexico have embodied 
these same values and objectives. For example: the National Union of Parents and their 
campaign in the 60s against communism; the National Family Front that was formed 
in opposition to progressive liberal laws in Mexico City in 2008; the infiltration of PAN 
by members of El Yunque in order to further their radical conservative agenda; the 
historical links between wealthy business groups in central and northern Mexico and 
extreme right groups; the current campaign being carried out against the government 
of Mexico by FRENA, with slogans in favor of private property and against 
communism while there’s suspicion that this group is funded by wealthy business 
groups from Nuevo León, such as the same ones that funded MURO in the 1960s171. 
Taking into account these different actions and strategies it is sufficiently clear the 
historical values and objectives of far right in Mexico remain very much aligned to the 
original ideas of “The Base” and Early Sinarquism. 
 
While the far right movements have remained active and alive for almost 100 years, it 
is difficult to ascertain a widespread success in participating in public life. If we take 
into account, the definition of success by David Art in which a PRR party can only be 
considered successful if it obtains 5% of the vote in three consecutive elections172; it 
becomes clear that no far right party in Mexico has ever been successful. They have 
historically lacked a popular base from which to pursue their agenda; focusing instead 
on wealthy and powerful sectors of Mexican society as demonstrated above. It is worth 
mentioning that Mexico was not a democracy until 1997, when the electoral glass 
ceiling was broken in congress173, and that far right groups and parties were repressed 
actively by the government prior to that, as depicted in government documents that 
narrate the close attention paid to Sinarquist events that usually ended up in arrests174. 
The argument could be made that in advocating for democracy, far right organizations 
 
171 El FRENA marcha en la CDMX y extiende su plantón en el Zócalo, 2020 
172 Art, D. (2011). Inside the Radical Right. Cambridge University Press, p. 4 
173 Martinez & Perez, n.d., pp. 25-30 
174 Informe sobre el seguimiento al mitin Sinarquista en San Luis de Potosí por la Dirección de 
Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 3 de septiembre de 1952 · Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la 
represión, n.d. 
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became anti-elite, at least on the political level. And so, perhaps the discourse of 
populism could be framed if democracy was an anti-political-elite discourse.  
 
It is true that there exist some focalized contemporary efforts to exploit anti-migrant 
propaganda in Mexico, for example the National Mexican Front and their recent protest 
against Haitian migrants in Tijuana175; it could be even said that during the 1940s the 
Golden Shirts, a fascist group with links to Sinarquism promoted a xenophobic and 
nationalist stance to little success176. However, far right parties and organizations have 
not adopted a nativist stance in contemporary Mexico, two main reasons argued here: 
first, Mexico is a country of migrants177, in which a high percentage of the population 
identifies to some degree with the type of migrant that comes to the country178, such as 
people from Central America or South America and the Caribbean; and second, the 
percentage of foreign-born population in Mexico is minuscule179, especially when 
compared to countries in Europe or the United States180, in so, migration in Mexico is 
a non-issue, suffocating almost any nativist ideology, apart from the regular soccer 
nationalism that rises during every World Cup.  
 
As mentioned above, far right organizations in Mexico, have historically been a part of 
democratizing efforts, particularly the electoral success of Vicente Fox in the 2000 
elections, the first time in which an opposition party won the Presidency in over 70 
years181. Vicente Fox was a former Coca-Cola executive and governor of Guanajuato, 
one of the cradles of Sinarquism, it is believed his political group included several 
members of El Yunque, including some who would eventually form his cabinet182. 
Several far right organizations were part of a wide coalition that supported Vicente Fox 
and PAN in their run for the Presidential elections, such as the National Union of 
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Parents or business councils linked to Sinarquism, such as the ones that supported 
political NGO “Amigos de Fox”, that would be instrumental in financing his 
presidential run183 without .  
 
It would be important to mention, that it is not clear if far right organizations in Mexico 
have democracy as an intrinsic value, however their public actions and efforts of its 
precursors have systematically supported the democratic transition in Mexico, and 
members of the organization have continuously taken part in the electoral process such 
as governorships in Guanajuato or Aguascalientes184 without the perception of being 
outliers in their authoritarian tendencies within the Mexican political system. So, other 
than specific cases such as the fascist Golden Shirts, or terrorist organizations such as 
MURO, it is hard to generalize the authoritarian trait for the rest of the far right 
organizations, unless we were to frame it within the authoritarian traits of governance 
in Mexico, but this last point remains beyond the scope of this work. To conclude with 
this section, we have stated the contemporary and historical characteristics of the far 
right in Mexico, and some incipient depth for the current PRR efforts or at the very 
least the closest Mexican relative to PRR, according to Western theory, has in the 
country.  
 
Finally, there seems to be a profound disconnection between factors such as low 
educational levels185, or economic inequality186, that are also attributed to be triggers 
to the current rise or the PRR in other parts of the world. The demand-side for PRR 
parties and organizations seem to exist, however it does not seems be able to garner 
support from this demand. This, however, could be explained by a similar case in 
Ireland, where both conditions exist on a segment of the population, however this 
segment seems to historically identify with a left leaning nationalistic party: Sinn Féin, 
by no means a populist radical right party. However, its core ideology seems to be able 
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to suck up the air from any PRR party that tries to aim for the young, poor or uneducated 
masses187. Could it be the same scenario in Mexico? for example with a party such a 
MORENA, with popular social policies and a discourse against corruption MORENA 
was able to win a successful presidential election in 2018188. While this assumption 
appears to point in the right direction further research is needed in order to establish 
and corroborate a secondary hypothesis.  
 
EU, US and Mexico: divergent paths? 
 
If we continue to use Mudde’s definition for the PRR and consider its three main 
characteristics: Nativism, Authoritarianism and Populism we can already observe how 
the Mexican far right starts to look intrinsically different to its counterparts in the 
United States and Europe. First; migration and xenophobia are a non-issue in Mexico, 
as the country itself is a source of migration and most migrants that come into the 
country are from ethnic origins similar to the Mexican, added to the multicultural 
notion of Mexicaness derived from its indigenous past and the official recognition by 
authorities by embedding it in the Constitution and educational programs, so nativism 
becomes largely irrelevant in sharp contrast to the rally-around-the-flag rhetoric against 
migration in the EU, made worst by the migrant crisis of 2015189,  and the US and the 
build-the-wall flag spued by President Trump190; second, far right groups and 
organizations in Mexico, from which the PRR emanates,  have been willing to 
participate in the democratic institutions of the country, even avoiding authoritarianism 
by becoming proponents of a democratic change in the country in the late 90s as 
participants in opposition parties aiming for political change191, in comparison we have 
seen a democratic decline in countries where PRR parties have become successful, such 
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as Hungary, Poland or even the United States192; and finally, third, it comes as no 
surprise that populist anti-elite discourse becomes unattainable if the main source of 
support to PRR in the country remains focalized in the middle and higher income 
brackets of Mexican society while this argument could gain strength with PRR 
opposing the current government, they are by no means not a part of the countries’ 
economic liberal elite anymore, this while we observe distinct discourses from the 
leadership of PRR parties or groups in Europe against liberal elites, the EU, and 
democratic institutions across the continent, in a clear polarization between the “good 
people, and the bad” such as statements made by Hungarian prime minister Viktor 
Orban193.  
 
The issue arises, if the contemporary PRR in Mexico does not seem to conform to 
characteristics imbedded in the mainstream theory about the topic, how can we even 
consider it PRR? It is a complicated issue to make a clear-cut definition of the 
characteristics of the PRR in Mexico, it is also complex to qualify PRR groups and 
organizations in the country as a part of the greater family of PRR around the world, 
although they would fit within the radical right family. However, recent developments 
in 2019 and 2020 give nascent evidence of an evolution going on within the radical 
right and PRR in Mexico that would possibly align them more with its international 
counterparts194. For this section we will attempt at finding the alignments with 
mainstream PRR parties and organizations in Europe and the US and Mexico; 
furthermore, make the argument that while PRR groups and organizations in Mexico 
remain distinct, they have adopted some of the tactics and dynamics of PRR in Europe 
and the US, which would fit them within the group family even if they don’t share 
some or all of their main characteristics.  
 
In order to continue this analysis, we must dig deeper into the similarities and 
differences between the PRR in Europe and the US and the equivalent organizations in 
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Mexico. For this, we will focus in two organizations that have recently emerged as the 
most visible examples of radical right or PRR in the country: first, FRENA, as 
mentioned above, as a reactionary group that seeks the immediate resignation of 
Mexico’s president, openly calling for civil disobedience and military intervention in 
order to oust the democratically elected government195; and second, Si Por México 
(SPM), an umbrella movement that agglomerates multiple organizations, with quite a 
few having connections to Sinarquism and the radical right in Mexico, such as the 
National Parents Union, National Family Front, Citizen Go, Nationalist Front of 
Mexico, and others, with the explicit goal of furthering their agenda through a call to 
action for opposition political parties196.  
 
This work aims to frame the contemporary radical right and PRR in Mexico within the 
fourth wave of the radical right as conceptualized by Cas Mudde. Albeit for the 
information gathered through the timeline accompanying this work, this fourth wave 
would have been belated by a few years in Mexico. It is in 2008, when we start seeing 
the first evidence in the public sphere of radical right organizations such as the National 
Family Front or as a PRR cousin in the National Citizens Front (FRENA).  
 
We can move forward by analyzing the different approaches adopted by FRENA and 
SPM. On the one side SPM is pushing for its agenda by calling opposition political 
parties to adopt it as their own, they have been successful so far in securing support 
from the three major opposition parties PRI, PAN, the historical right party, and 
PRD197; much in line with the new acceptability and mainstreaming of far right parties 
and organizations within the fourth wave198. It is important to note however that it is 
not clear what the extents of the agenda of SPM is as of today, it focuses on social 
spending, security and fighting corruption, but gives no further details about the 
specifics of it199, so while we are including it within the radical right for their links to 
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Sinarquism, this approach could change in the future as they evolve. Political parties 
such as the Conservatives in the UK have been able to seize the opportunity for 
renovated support by adopting populist radical right policies into their government 
programs such as tougher stances on migration200. On the other side, however, FRENA 
doesn’t seem to have a public stance on relevant issues or public policies from analysis 
made from its website and social media platforms, nor a particular ideology from which 
these could emanate; instead, their core message implies a call to action to overthrow 
the government in Mexico embodied by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador by 
categorizing him as a “communist dictator”201. 
 
It is becoming increasingly evident that the main link that connects the PRR in Mexico 
to its western cousins could be authoritarianism. It is true, radical right organizations 
in Mexico have openly participated in the democratic transition in the country, 
however, we can’t overlook the fact that organizations such as FRENA are, at the very 
least, calling for the Mexican military to intervene. This while the extended radical 
right in Mexico has been involved in a crusade against insecurity and violence, at least 
since the government of Felipe Calderón of PAN in 2006, who deployed the military 
internally and called for an all-out-war against the drug cartels in Mexico202; much like 
Viktor Orban deployed the Hungarian military across the Hungarian border in order to 
push migrants back to Serbia in 2016203. This last strategy by President Calderón, was 
acknowledged by many as a way to legitimize his government in the aftermath of a 
very contested election204. While Calderón himself was not considered part of any 
radical right group, it is widely believed he made an alliance with The Organization205 
in order to secure power and was supported in his law & order focused policies while 
in office. Furthermore, during his administration other types of authoritarian policies 
were followed; if we embrace Cas Mudde’s use of authoritarianism as the notion that 
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infringements of authority must be severely punished206, such as drug-addiction or 
sexual deviancy, we could say the authoritarian policies followed during Calderon’s 
administration include the judicial fight against same-sex partnerships in Mexico City 
by the General Prosecutor’s Office207 and harsher prison sentences for drug users208.  
 
Much like the PRR in the United States, the PRR, and its extended family the radical 
right has a very close relationship with religion. While the US has leaders that openly 
call for the influence of Christianity in politics such as Pat Buchanan or Sarah Palin209, 
Mexico has far right organizations emanated from an historical struggle from Catholic 
groups first for freedom of religion, and now against progressive values for example. 
It is also important to note that Mexican PRR could be more aligned religiously with 
the PiS Government in Poland210 or the credos of VOX in Spain211, exploiting 
Catholicism in order to secure electoral support. For example, PAN party in its electoral 
platform for 2021 includes two issues that have been championed by the ultra-catholic 
National Family Front: first, a ban on abortion212; and second, the right of parents to 
forbid sexual education in schools or to allow public displays of religious cult213. This 
electoral platform will surely transcend into the general platform for SPM in which 
PAN takes part. 
 
It could be said that the Mexican radical right and the populist radical right are starting 
to differ one from the other; however, that is not the focus of the present work. 
However, we can observe a continuation from the far right to PRR, not only historical 
but also ideological. While the Mexican PRR remains a nascent phenomenon, we can 
already observe some characteristics that resonate from its counterparts in the West. It 
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might still be theoretically distinct, but it seems to possess enough similitudes to be 








































The populist radical right appears to remain somehow elusive in Mexico. There is 
enough evidence to suggest that groups exist, and that they are active and have 
incidence in the political process. However, they remain marginal, for now, in terms of 
numbers. The far right for its part has remained a part of the political life of Mexico for 
at least 100 years, with its origins in the post-revolutionary years and continuing today 
in organizations that can be linked to its very conception and the many seedlings that 
have appeared and disappeared once and again along the years.  
 
Its secretive nature and lack of representation via successful political parties makes it 
difficult for extensive academic research other than historical accounts. Even today, it 
is not always clear which organizations are behind certain movements or causes in the 
public debate, or even who the real leaders or financiers are. Its codependent 
relationship with the historical center-right party blurs the line of its influence and size 
even more.  
 
This work began by stating the research question of Why has there not been an increase 
in support for far right parties and organizations in Mexico?, it also included four 
expectations to be found during the research process, ahead they will be addressed in 
order: 
 
First, the expectation that the spark that ignited the re-appearance of the far right in the 
country was due to the introduction of highly controversial new laws in Mexico City. 
It is fair to say that far right groups appeared as a response to the announcement and 
approval of laws that allowed for same-sex partnerships and legalized abortions freely 
up to the 12th week. These groups such as the National Family Front managed to 
catalyze the sentiment of conservatives across the country, setting up the scene for 
further radical right, and eventually populist radical right groups to appear in the public 
debate. Groups like FRENA, closer to the populist radical right definition, now nourish 
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themselves from smaller groups and organizations, such as the “Viva Cristo Rey” 
group, that emanated from historical far right groups and organizations dating back to 
the Mexican Revolution and the Cristero Wars.  
 
Second, the notion that the far right in Mexico hasn’t been able to appeal to the masses, 
in order to gather enough support and eventually transcend into a successful political 
party or group. As this research progressed it became clear that the radical right in 
Mexico and in that way, also, the populist radical right, as well as the extreme right, 
have its grassroot component emanating from the middle- and higher-income 
segments, with a small component in the traditional population targets of the PRR in 
the young uneducated target groups. This seems to hinder their ability to recruit and 
grow.  
 
Third, the political context of Mexico has created a particular set of circumstances that 
have had a direct impact in how the far right, and so the PRR develop in the country. 
There seems to be a movement contrary to the left-leaning government of Mexico, 
gathering support in many of the organizations identified as part of the radical right, 
and even a new organization such as FRENA that is starting to resemble PRR 
organizations in other parts of the world. Some of the slogans of FRENA echo the anti-
communist rhetoric of far right movements in the 1960s and 1970s; as they are quick 
to identify the current government with a communist authoritarian regime, as noted 
above.  
 
Fourth, the far right and PRR in Mexico still seems to lack any specific hot topic that 
would serve as a rally-around-the-flag catalyzer. With this in mind we can observe that 
immigration into Mexico is not a relevant enough issue to work as such. There is not a 
comparable population of foreign-born residents in the country in contrast to the United 
States or several European countries, nor does the perception amongst Mexicans is 
grave enough for their arrival into the country to represent a serious political issue. This 
in great part to the multicultural character of the Mexican society and the lack of 
otherness towards most migrants that happen to cross into Mexico. There are also 
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additional notions that could be ventured from the research efforts carried out for the 
present work: 
 
First, the Mexican far right seems to be entrenched in political dynamics that reminisce 
of the time when it was actively repressed by the Mexican government, for the most 
part they remain in the margins of the public dialogue and seem to rather be in the 
shadows forging alliances or giving quiet support to mainstream political parties. 
Despite the appearance of very public organizations such as FRENA or the National 
Family Front, the leaders behind these movements, providing support and financing 
have not yet come forward, nor materialized these efforts into their own viable political 
organizations.  
 
Second, as these organizations fail to gather systemic support for their agenda, beyond 
opposition parties taking advantage of the issues for their own political gain, there 
doesn’t seem to be enough appetite in Mexico for the far right or populist radical right 
to become successful. It could even be guessed that there won’t be a PRR party anytime 
soon in Mexico.  
 
Third, despite this previous notion, there is evidence that at least in what concerns the 
PRR in Mexico, there is some organic growth in its ranks. The Mexican PRR is starting 
to resemble its counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, and so 
on, something that the far right, as a whole, never managed to accomplish. And while 
there doesn’t seem to be space for a PRR party in the country, there will probably be 
PRR organizations as a part of public discourse for the time to come, albeit in the 
fringes.  
 
There is also, one additional notion, that has not been properly studied in this work, but 
that could probably make for further work on the matter. Octavio Paz, prominent 
narrator of Mexican culture and identity, believed that Mexicans possess an unhealthy 
obsession with forms, this being understood as rituals, protocols, publicly accepted 
speech, social norms, amongst others. Paz elaborated that this obsession denies 
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Mexicans of a proclivity to radical thoughts, where the far right and the PRR are 
located, as they become, in a way, unacceptable expressions of political thought214.  
 
The political context of Mexico seems to be quickly evolving, the current government 
and the opposition remain at odds in the middle of a pandemic that has deeply 
transformed the public life of the country. The aftermath of the democratic transition 
left power vacuums that have been filled with democratic processes but the 
shortcomings of several administrations still present challenges that so far haven’t been 
met. Distribution of wealth, social reform, healthcare, corruption and violence remain 
systemic problems in Mexico, and while the PRR hasn’t been able to capitalize on these 
issues, there’s no certainty that they won’t be able to do it in the future.  
 
The study of the far right and PRR in Mexico, while historically neglected, may still 
prove useful in the further understanding in how these ideologies are born, how they 
evolve and how they may be countered. It is possible to observe a new branch of the 
worldwide PRR movement during its consolidation; while at the same time we already 
have some theoretical and analytical tools to measure and analyze; this while 
incorporating new knowledge from alternative regions that enrich our understanding 
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Annex 1: PRR in Mexico 2008-2019 
 




The recently approved “Sociedades de Convivencia” law enters into force allowing 





Mexico City Assembly passed a law legalizing abortion during the first 12 weeks of 
pregnancy despite fierce opposition by Catholic groups such as the Catholic Lawyers 




Knights Templar, the Kings of Columbus and of Malta, made a pilgrimage in support 





The Federal Institute for Elections declines to register the Solidaridad political party 
for irregularities in their founding assemblies. This party had links to the historical 
Sinarquist movement and extreme right former PAN members Fernando Rivera and 
René Bolio, both linked to former President Fox and José Luis Luegue the then head 
of the National Water Comission under a PAN government. The party is said to have 
 
215 “Diez años de Sociedades de Convivencia, el inicio de una nueva era,” 2017 
216 Ciudad de México Despenaliza El Aborto | Internacional | EL PAÍS, n.d. 
217 Sánchez Fuentes & Ubaldi Garcete, 2008, pp. 39-44 
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The National Citizen’s Congress is formed in Nuevo Leon, Mexico219. The group has 
characteristics of being anti political establishment, ultra-capitalist220 and promotes the 
death penalty for corrupt public officials221. It’s leader Gilberto Lozano, has over 
200,000 followers on FB, he also boasts that migration, abortion and equal marriage 




Mexico’s Supreme Court upholds Mexico City’s legislation legalizing the right for 




Mexico City’s Assembly approved a modification to the civil code in order to allow 






218 “Frena el IFE A sinarquistas y panistas de extrema derecha,” 2008 
219 Nunes, n.d., p.324 
220 Gilberto Lozano, el hombre que grita, n.d. 
221 Él Es Gilberto Lozano, Empresario Que Estuvo En El Gabinete de Fox e Intenta Sacar a AMLO Con 
FRENA | SinEmbargo MX, n.d. 
 
222 Gilberto Lozano, el hombre que grita, n.d. 
223 México, 2008 
224 BBC Mundo - América Latina - México DF, n.d. 
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Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s government (PAN) presented a constitutional 
controversy to annul Mexico City’s equal marriage law. It’s unprecedented for a sitting 





The Supreme Court ruled that marriage was not to be defined with procreation ends or 
between only man and woman, opening the door for same sex marriage in the entire 
country, with this ruling the jurisprudence is enforced, and same-sex couples will be 




Confamilia presents a citizen’s law initiative to reform article 4th of the Mexican 
Constitution to establish marriage exclusively as a union between a man and a woman. 
This initiative came with more than 200,000 signatures, surpassing the minimum 




The National Front for the Family is formed, claiming to unite more than 1,000 
organizations nationwide, and in direct response to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s 





225 Calderón cuestiona bodas gay en DF, 2010 
226 Una jurisprudencia de la SCJN respalda a los matrimonios homosexuales, 2015 
227 ConFamilia impulsa reforma constitucional al artículo 4, 2016 
228 Nuestra Historia -, n.d. 
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Debacle for the ruling PRI party at the governor elections, losing 7 out of 12 governor 
races and moving out to the opposition in 4 of them229. The NFF claims the results are 
evidence of the citizen’s being against the President’s proposal for equal marriage 
presented a few weeks earlier. Conservative party PAN, alone or allied with left parties 




“National Forum for a Citizen’s Initiative”, organized by organizations part of the NFF 
takes place in Mexico, with PAN politician Claudia Sánchez saying “It’s our 




President of the National Union of Parents, part of the NFF, Miguel Raygoza declared 
that Homosexuality is a disease, that Marriage must be exclusively between Man and 




Former PAN leader and congressman Rodrigo Iván Cortés met with pope Francis to 






229 El PAN Rompe En Las Elecciones de México Frente al Descalabro Del PRI | Internacional | EL PAÍS, n.d. 
230 Histórica Derrota Del PRI En 7 de 12 Estados: Influyó El Voto de Castigo Profamilia Por Su Giro LGBT 
– Andoc, n.d. 
231 Plascencia, 2016 
232 Homosexualidad Es Una Enfermedad: Dice Frente Nacional Por La Familia, n.d. 
233 '¡Hagan lío!”, aconsejó el Papa al líder de los defensores de la familia 'natural”, n.d. 
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Periodical investigative journal Proceso links ultra-catholic reactionary group El 
Yunque to the protests being organized for the 10th of September, replicating the 
strategy of Hazte Oír and Citizen Go in Spain against the government of Rodriguez 
Zapatero when he proposed to legalize abortion in the country. Confamilia president 




18,000 people marched in Mexico City against Equal Marriage, protest organized by 
the NFF, a great number or religious organizations participated in the protest, including 
nuns, and priests. There was a counter march in favor of Gay Rights of a comparable 
size. Similar protests took place in more than 25 cities across Mexico; organizers 
claimed that more than 1,2 million protestors took to the streets, however real numbers 




The leadership of the National Front for the Family acknowledges that between its 
memberships there are religious leaders from the Catholic Church and also politicians 
linked to PES party such as Edith Martínez (she took part in protests in favor of the 
NFF on September 11 2016) and the rest of the PES legislative group in , former 
politician from PAN Fernando Guzman Peláez, now vice-president of Confamilia, one 
of the NFF founding organizations as well as congresswoman Cecilia Romero and 
Alejandra Reynoso from PAN in the federal Congress, as well as former congressman 




234 El Yunque, la mano que mece al Frente Nacional por la Familia, n.d. 
 
235 Sin Embargo, n.d. 




Candidate for governor of the State of Mexico and former presidential candidate 
Josefina Vazquez Mota signs a commitment with the National Family Front in 
exchange for political support. She promises to enact policies to maintain a prohibition 




Senator Ana Guevara is assaulted by 4 men, and later seen publicly showing her 
injuries promoted the emergence of the hashtag #GolpearMujeresesFelicidad, as an 
example of anti-feminist rhetoric in social media, reminiscent of trolling attacks in the 
US. The hashtag was created by an alt right group called Legión Holk, who also 
promoted the hashtag #MatarGaysNoEsDelito after the Orlando Pulse Massacre. The 
groups mascot is Pepe the Frog. A month after the Pulse Massacre the group would be 
again in the news after member Federico Guevara left a final message prior to 





Presidential candidate Ricardo Anaya from the collation PAN-PRD-Movimiento 
Ciudadano met with the leadership of the NFF and agreed to reject policies that would 
allow abortions to be carried out legally. Previously José Meade from PRI party also 




237 Elecciones Edomex 2017: El PRI y El PAN Se Disputan El Voto Conservador En El Estado de México | 
Internacional | EL PAÍS, n.d. 
238 Aguilera & ContributorEconomist, 400 C.E. 




A group of protesters in Tijuana numbered in the hundreds tried to overrun a police 
blockade in order to reach a migrant safe haven in the city. The protestors were against 
migrants and any time of migration to Mexico, claiming they brought crime and chaos 




Group Leaders for Life and Family is created, the group advocates anti-abortion 
policies and a traditional family model. They are linked to Cristero (Such as Guardia 
Cristera CDMX) organizations and the NFF. Media personalities and celebrities with 
conservative values form their main core of activists. The group also has an explicit 
anti-feminist stance and seems to be inspired by the blue scarf movement in Argentina. 





16,000 march in Mexico City and in another 30 cities in the country to protest against 





The Nacional Citizen’s Congress along with Chalecos Mexico calls for protests in 
different cities of Mexico, around 6,000 people join. They call for the destitution of the 
President for treason and call for and end of sex education and gender studies, as well 
 
240 Un Grupo Protesta Contra Migrantes En Tijuana; Se Enfrentan Con Policías al Tratar de Avanzar Hacia 
Un Albergue, n.d. 
241 Líderes por la Vida y la Familia (@LideresXlaVida) / Twitter, n.d. 
242 “Así no, AMLO,” 2019 
 117 
as abortion rights and equal marriage. One protest in Coahuila state also called for 





Around 1,000 people protested in the state of Nuevo Leon against legalizing abortions 
in the state, the protest was organized and promoted by the NFF. In the protest former 
PAN state congressman Francisco Treviño declared that the new federal amnesty bill 
includes pardoning women in jail for abortion. The organization also stated that they 











The state congress of Puebla rejected a proposal to decriminalize abortion in the state, 
as well as to recognize same-sex marriages. The main votes against came from the 
majority party MORENA, in contrast to a similar vote in the state of Oaxaca a couple 
of weeks early in which MORENA politicians voted in favor. The recently elected 
governor from the same party, previously in favor of both causes now rejects them in 
lieu of the “values” of the state246. 
 
243 Realizan protestas contra AMLO en varios estados del país, 2019 
244 Frente Nacional por la Familia se manifiesta contra el aborto en NL, 2019 
 
245 El Congreso de Oaxaca Aprueba La Despenalización Del Aborto, n.d. 
246 En Puebla Rechazan Despenalizar El Abordo; Sólo Reducen Condena, n.d. 
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